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I.

INTRODUCTION

We submitted this paper in response to Henry King's novel and difficult
request for a perspective relevant to the interest of experts in law on the legal
aspects of managing migratory species that wander across jurisdictional
boundaries. Each jurisdiction has a management agency with responsibilities
for "optimizing" the interactions between migratory species and humans.
Each of the relevant management agencies is unique, as each agency must
contend with a unique mix of groups of people with a number of direct or
indirect interests in a unique mix of stocks or populations of migratory
species. Here, we discuss what we infer to be key features in this conceptual
complexity from a broad legal perspective. We focus mostly on migratory
creatures in the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence River Basin and take an ecosystem
approach. For us, this approach requires that we employ a number of
compatible perspectives on the complex issue of how the population(s) of
migratory species and humans with different interests in these species
interact and how that interaction might be changed through human
management processes. An ecosystem approach to migratory animals in an
explicit sense began to emerge in this part of the world around 1968; we use
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our current understanding of that approach to review what has gone before in
recent centuries and to predict what will follow the present.
In order to sketch a broad perspective within which to address one general
kind of migratory animal - migratory fish - we will look at three kinds of
migratory animals. We will then quickly focus on the migratory fish of the
Lake Erie Basin for empirical content in order to contain the scale and
complexity of this essay.
This paper traces the biological and policy aspects of migratory species.
We attempt to make clear that "management" of such species presents
multitudinous challenges owing especially to the scale of species' migration.
In sum, migrations often encompass a number of political jurisdictions and
coordinated management is rare to non-existent. Hence, we make a call for
new approaches and sketch out some possibilities.
We explain, and, we hope, clarify, certain key underpinning scientific
concepts. Seeing clearly and understanding the environmental issues that
have brought the Lake Erie Basin (as an example of many such areas) to its
current condition requires knowledge from a number of domains, including
biology, ecology, and politics. This important knowledge holds keys for
conceiving potentially effective plans and policy directions as well as
implementing them.
Currently, governance regimes concerning fish in the Great Lakes are in
flux. In the past, the main emphasis in the governance of human activities
related to fish species in the Great Lakes Basin has been on the "middle
level" of organization through command-and-control regulatory structures.
Unwanted booms and busts of fish populations have nevertheless occurred,
so we consider two complementary approaches that appear to us to have been
emerging in recent decades. One approach starts from a bottom or lower
level of governance organization and reaches upward to interconnect with a
middle level now modified to place less emphasis on command-and-control
capabilities. The other approach starts from a higher level and reaches
downward to the middle and through it to a local level. We will explore this
three-level interactive approach to the governance of human interactions with
migratory species. Imaginatively, we will focus on the applicability and
usefulness of such an approach for the management of Lake Erie migratory
fish stocks, in the past, present and future.
Five ecological perspectives are commonly, if implicitly, invoked by
contemporary managers:
1. life history and population dynamics of each of the more valued
stocks of the more valued species;
2. trophodynamic or predator-prey interactions of different species of
fish and other kinds of organisms;
3. risk of extinction of a particular stock;
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4.

use of mass-production fish hatcheries in attempts to compensate for
insufficient reproductive success of a valued stock; and
5. self-maintaining ecosystem integrity.
A complementary set of five ecological perspectives appears to us to be
under consideration, perhaps only implicitly, by strategic thinkers among the
researchers, managers and administrators in the Basin:
1. ecosystem dynamics in which major self-organized associations of
species may vie for dominance in the overall ecosystem, as with a
benthic association linked to the bottom of a lake or large river and a
pelagic association linked to offshore surface waters;
2. the temperature preferences of different species, which appear to be
'hard-wired' genetically, as related to seasonal spatio-temporal
features of the habitat;
3. the migratory propensities of different species, which may be based
on some 'hard-wired' behavioral features related to critical habitat
requirements of some life history stages;
4. reconstruction or rehabilitation of critical habitats needed for
spawning and nursery purposes and clearing of obstacles from a
migratory route to such habitats; and
5. general habitat features that permit the self-organization of preferred
associations of fish species as such.
The different legal aspects of the agencies responsible for managing
migratory species are based in part on a set of ecological perspectives that
before now have implicitly emphasized the first set of perspectives sketched
above. In this paper, we will explore legal perspectives that may link to the
latter set of five.
II.

WANDERING BEINGS AS UTILITARIAN, RECREATIONAL,
ESTHETIC OR SACRED THINGS

Many living things are not sedentary throughout all stages of their lives.
Many land plants are sedentary in an adult stage but have wind-blown or
animal-borne seeds, each of which is a young stage of that living thing.
Many animals are active in a more purposeful way, seeking out desirable
habitat and food that may be found in different locales in different seasons of
the year. Comparably, water currents carry many plants and water-borne
organisms such as plankton over large distances.
Different humans may attach different kinds of importance to particular
living things. Some beings may be useful or harmful in a purely utilitarian
sense; those values may be approximately quantified in monetary units.
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Other beings may be of interest to sport recreationists; in that case, the value
of those beings may be approximated by determining, for example, the
number of days of angler pleasure derived from the presence of fish. Some
may be aesthetically attractive or offensive; in this case, any quantification
may be suspect. Still other beings may be valued in their own right as
evolutionary creations or as sacred in a spiritual way, and here attempts at
quantification may be dismissed as sacrilegious. Formal quantification may
be performed in an attempt to limit the need for subjective decisions by
decisionmakers, but this may involve prior burial of the subjectivity within
the presuppositions on which the quantifier bases the quantification
algorithm, perhaps to the distress of particular stakeholders who may feel
that their values have been implicitly slighted. Thus, quantification, in and of
itself, does not resolve the subjectivity issue unless all the stakeholders have
concurred in an informal way with all the particulars of the assumptions that
go into the formulation of the quantification algorithm. While some species
may be useful, recreational, esthetic and sacred, there are perhaps million of
other species that may never have attracted human attention at all. Also,
some species once cherished in one environmental context may be despised
as pests in another.
"Useful Beings:" Waterfowl, Fish, and Ungulate Mammals
For migratory birds like waterfowl (geese, ducks, swans, etc.), vast
flyways fanning out to the North are commonly used as the relevant aerial
domain for crossjurisdictional joint management.' Within these flyways the
shallow waters and wetlands are particularly desirable habitats for waterfowl.
With some waterfowl, the shallows of Lake Erie may serve as a marshalling
place in the spring and fall migrations between wintering areas to the South
and summering areas to the North.2 The shallows also serve as reproductive
and summering areas for some southerly species and as feeding and
wintering areas for some northerly species of waterfowl. An important point:
Lake Erie and its Basin do not offer year-round habitat for most individuals
of any species of waterfowl. So, one of the implications for waterfowl

In the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-G.B (for
Canada), 39 Stat. 1702, the parties recognize that "[m]any species of birds in the course of
their annual migration traverse certain parts of the United States and the Dominion of
Canada;" the Convention implies that the relevant domain of management of these species
covers the entirety of the jurisdictional boundaries of both countries. See also NORTH
AMERICAN WATERFOWL MANAGEMENT PLAN,

1998 UPDATE: EXPANDING THE VISION 37

(1998), availableat http://www.nawmp.ca/pdf/update-e.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Birdwatching: Become a Lake Erie Wingwatcher!, at http://www.sandusky.
net/recreation/bird.html (last visited May 28, 2002).
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managers of our Basin is that local and regional waterfowl managers have to
fit into a larger spatial and temporal management domain.
For fish (sturgeon, lake trout, walleye), we focus on a notion of the Lake
Erie Basin as a special context for some management purposes. A Basin like
this is usually demarcated in part by the height of land, where a falling
raindrop has equal probability of flowing toward Lake Erie or to a different
water body in a contiguous Basin. There seems to be no convention in place
concerning where to draw this Basin's boundary line in the in-flowing
Detroit River or even further upstream; the out-flowing Niagara River has
Niagara Falls as a convenient natural demarcation that may be deceptively
distinct. Some stocks of Lake Erie's lake whitefish and sturgeon migrate into
the Detroit River to spawn. 3 One or more walleye stocks migrate up the
Detroit River, eastward along the south shore of Lake St. Clair and up the
Thames River to spawn.4 Some of the young of blue pike, which is now
extinct, were apparently washed over the Falls into Lake Ontario; perhaps
some adult blue pike swam up the Welland Canal to spawn in Lake Erie.5 So
from a perspective of the wandering fish of Lake Erie, the upstream and
downstream boundaries of the relevant domain cannot be demarcated
precisely on a map.
Unfortunately, while political jurisdictions usually have sharply
demarcated spatial boundaries, sharp ecological boundaries are the
exception. Even still, it would serve jurisdiction-based legal experts well if
particular migratory species could be described as relating to clearly
quantified spatial boundaries of some type. For example, a migratory species
may congregate seasonally in quite restricted locales, say for reproduction or
for staging a migration event, and then wander widely between such events.
For wandering mammals (e.g., deer, moose) in the Basin of some
centuries ago, the seasonal habitats and wanderings related to particular
features of the terrestrial, stream, beaver meadows and wetland parts of the
ecosystems. Unlike bison, the deer and moose did not migrate long
distances. Indeed, along parts of the south shore of Lake Erie, the tributaries
are short so that individual moose and deer that once lived there may well
have wandered back and forth across the height of land that separates the
Great Lakes Basin from the Ohio River Basin, and occasionally over the ice
across Lake Erie.
3 See J.J. Kay & H.A. Regier, An Ecosystemic Two-Phase Attractor Approach to Lake
Erie's Ecology, in STATE OF LAKE ERIE: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 511, 523 (M. Munawar et

al. eds., 1999).
4 See id.
5 The blue pike is believed to have reproduced only in Lake Erie. See STANFORD H.
SMITH, EARLY CHANGES IN THE FISH COMMUNITY OF LAKE ONTARIO 4 (Great Lakes Fishery

Comm'n, Technical Rep. No. 60, 1995), available at http://www.glfc.org/pubs/TechReports/
Tr6O.pdf.
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The Challenges of "Managing" Migrating Species
The necessary scale of the "spatial management unit" is very different for
these three types of wandering animals as they relate to Lake Erie and
beyond. For mammals such as deer and moose, a minimum scale might be
5,000 square miles. For fish, the scale might be 50,000 square miles; for
birds, perhaps 500,000 square miles. Thus, the intra- and inter-jurisdictional
decision-making process takes on a different form for the different kinds of
animals. The larger the scope of the spatial management unit, the more
private property owners, local communitarian stewards and jurisdictional
administrators need to be involved in the decision-making and enforcement
process. Consequentially, the higher the levels of government that become
involved in the process, the more formal the decision-making process
becomes. In this respect the fish of Lake Erie are "managed" in an interjurisdictional way that is intermediate between the management
organizations in place for waterfowl and mammals. These animals may all
interact ecologically within a locale of the Basin, say, in the waters and
wetlands of a shallow bay, and individual humans may relate to all three
kinds in a complicated way, but the management processes have been
separate in practice.
There have always been some humans with particular interests in certain
species who have migrated seasonally to come into contact, or to stay in
contact, with that species. Aboriginals still retain some of this migratory
behavior, often leaving their reserves to harvest duck, deer and walleye in
nearby lands and waters in which they enjoy treaty-based usufructuary rights
or privileges. 6 Commercial fowlers, hunters and fishers continue to practice
some migratory behavior in the Lake Erie Basin and elsewhere.
Recreationists migrate to locales in which their preferred species is
accessible to viewing or capture, or perhaps even as a trophy for which to
compete amongst themselves in a fish derby. Spiritual naturalists may make
pilgrimages to particular sacred locales. Each of these kinds of human
migratory behavior has its own particular learned choreography, and the
whole set can become quite complex, especially for a manager who attempts
to keep these different classes of human migrators spatially and temporally
separated from one another in order to minimize conflict between them.
Arranging for such human migratory activities and then administering them
in detail is one of the primary responsibilities of a conventional fish or
wildlife management agency.
6

See, e.g., Treaty with the Ottawa, Ect., March 28, 1836, U.S.-Ottawa/Chippewa Nations,

7 Stat. 491, available at http://www.lib.cmich.edu/clarke/washington1836.htm (last visited
May 22, 2002) [hereinafter Treaty of 1836]; U.S. v. Michigan, No. M-26-73 (W.D. Mich. filed
Jun. 1 , 1985) (consent decree).
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With respect to concerted efforts toward sharing, enjoying, protecting and
revering valued wandering and migratory animals like those mentioned
above, each species may require a specific protocol based on an
understanding of the spatio-temporal features of that species' life history.
The protocol should make sense at a number of different levels of
organization within the governance system: the individual property owner,
the municipality, the state or province, the nation state, the continent and
beyond.
As a historic generalization, the relative difficulty of "managing" different
kinds of interaction between humans and valued creatures is in the order,
high to low, as follows:
commercial harvester, recreational
hunter/fisher/fowler, naturalist enjoyer, and spiritual communer. Unless the
most difficult of these political and/or socioeconomic management
challenges (relating to commercial harvesting) is done effectively and
sufficiently, humans with the other three kinds of interests may be cheated of
their rights by those who are more difficult to manage. Perhaps the particular
difficulty with commercial fishers relates to the politically privileged position
enjoyed by entrepreneurs; the aquacultural entrepreneurs may now be
challenging the commercial capture fishers for the most privileged position.
However, other interests and parties have already preempted the rights
enjoyed by commercial harvesters. The destructive and polluting activities
of foresters, farmers, builders, industrialists, shippers and developers on land
and in the water, and over which natural resources managers typically have
little control and knowledge, have often destroyed the essential and scarce
habitat of these valued migratory beings.
In prior years, the main approach to "managing" commercial and
recreational harvesters of a particular valued fish species has been to
constrain the harvesting process by forcing fishers to use progressively less
efficient capture techniques and/or to restrict fishing to seasonal periods and
to habitat locales when and where the organisms are not particularly
vulnerable to capture,7 thereby limiting mortality. The standard response of
the harvesters has been to improve the efficiency of those techniques that are
still legally permitted or to invent new techniques. The management
response has been to outlaw some of these new efficiencies and/or
inventions, and the spiral has continued. Gradually, starting with commercial
harvesters and then extending to recreational harvesters, the size of harvest
permitted a particular harvester has been progressively limited, and then the
number of licensed harvesters has been capped or reduced. In some
7 See, e.g., Fisheries Act, s.8, 1868 S.C. (31 Vict.) 177, 180 (closed season for lake and
river trout), s.9, 1868 S.C. at 181 (closed seasons for whitefish). See also MARGARET BEATTIE
BOGUE, FISHING THE GREAT LAKES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY, 1783-1933 187-190
(2000).
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instances, a kind of market mechanism was used to allocate "individual
transferable quotas" (ITQs) among fishers and recover a "resource rent" to
the state as the "owner" of the resource. Small spatial refuges for a particular
season may have been extended to a larger year-round refuge. Or,
commercial harvesting in certain regions may have been phased out entirely.
Overall, the current trend in the management of Lake Erie fisheries is a
pragmatic mix of most of these strategies. With respect to fish, the
recreational harvesters are currently politically dominant, while the
commercial fishers, naturalist enjoyers and any spiritual communers are subdominant.
III.

ECOSYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE ON MIGRATORY FISH IN
LAKE ERIE

Most of the native fish species in Lake Erie once had relatively
predictable migratory behaviour related to seasonal meteorological and
hydrological patterns in the lake's Basin. The space-time migratory paths of
different species were not random with respect to each other, but exhibited a
degree of inter-species choreography. The choreographed regularities
accommodated both antagonistic and mutualistic propensities of particular
stocks. One of the consequences of two centuries of careless abuse of this
ecosystem by European settlers and their descendants was a loss of much of
the complex earlier patterns and regularities by the 1950s. Migratory
patterns that bear some resemblance to earlier patterns and some newer
patterns may be currently self-organizing, 8 as we sketch below.
The complex migratory patterns of fish in the year A.D. 1600 or B.P. 400
was, for example, a product of creative evolution that occurred during the
past million years or more in what is now the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence
River Basin (GL/SLRB) and in what are now the headwaters of river basins
to the south and west of the GL/SLRB. During this long period, wandering
rivers were a more constant feature of this landscape than were stationary
lakes. , As a glacier advanced southward it filled the lakes with ice and
scoured out the lake bottom; the resident fish had to adapt to the smaller
lakes that formed at the southern face of the glaciers and to the rivers that
flowed southward from the edge of the glacier. As a glacier melted and the
lakes became free of ice, the fish re-invaded the lakes (this occurred a
number of times in recent geological history). 9 During this period, some kind
8 See J.J. Kay & H.A. Regier, supra note 3, at 527 (M. Munawar et al. eds., 1999).
See WILBUR HARTMAN, EFFECTS OF EXPLOITATION, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES, AND
NEW SPECIES ON THE FISH HABITATS AND RESOURCES OF LAKE ERIE 3 (Great Lakes Fishery
9

Comm'n Technical Rep. No. 22, 1973), available at http://www.glfc.org/pubs/TechReports/
Tr22.pdf.
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of an association of fish species that included most of those now present in
Lake Erie must have continued as an association that migrated southwards
and then northward again at irregular intervals.
During this million-year span, rivers dominated over lakes as habitat for
predecessors of fish now in the Basin. So the species that thrived in Lake
Erie four centuries ago were mostly obligative riverine for some critical life
history stages and facultative lacustrine for more tolerant stages. The
relatively rare spawning and nursery areas were usually in the more riverine
parts, whereas relatively abundant feeding and resting areas for sub-adults
and adults were more typically in the lacustrine portions.
One cannot just glance at a geographic/hydrographic map of the Lake
Erie Basin and identify what are here termed the riverine and lacustrine parts
of the aquatic ecosystem. The key feature that makes a part of an aquatic
ecosystem riverine is the presence of strong horizontal water currents;
conversely, a part is lacustrine in the absence of those currents.
All parts of this aquatic ecosystem also have vertical currents. In riverine
parts these may be called turbulences; they peak in the main channel during
spates and floods. In lacustrine parts, vertical currents are strongest when the
water is all the same temperature from top to bottom and the whole mass is
stirred by strong winds. In Lake Erie, vertical currents tend to peak
seasonally during the equinoctial storms of spring and fall when all the water
is isothermal. 10 These events challenge the survival capabilities of fish,
which usually seek out some less violent parts of the ecosystem at such
times. But these events also scrub spawning gravels and rocks clean and
inundate flood plains and wetlands; both events are very important for the
successful spawning and nursery purposes of a variety of fish species.
In the Lake Erie Basin, the in-flowing Detroit River, the numerous
tributaries draining the watershed and the out-flowing Niagara River are all
riverine in nature; all of these are two-sided rivers. But there are also strong,
relatively persistent currents along many stretches of shoreline due to a
number of factors, such as gravity pulling water down slope from Detroit to
Buffalo, wind blowing mostly from the western half of the compass, and the
effect of the earth's rotation or Coriolis force. Where such strong currents
flow laterally along shore quite persistently, a riverine form of local'
ecosystem self-organizes, as akin to a one-sided river.

Jo See Henry A. Regier & James J. Kay, An Heuristic Model of Transformations of the

Aquatic Ecosystems of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin, 8 J. AQUATIC ECOSYSTEM
HEALTH 3, 6 (1996), available at http://www.fes.uwaterloo.ca/u/jjkay/pubs/rk/reg.html. The
term "isothermal" means "of, relating to, or marked by equality of temperature." WEBSTER'S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 609 (1979) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
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Parts of the lake that do not experience relatively persistent strong lateral
currents have a lacustrine kind of ecological organization. Such parts include
the offshore waters of the Central and Eastern Basin.
The Western Basin of Lake Erie is a complex mosaic of riverine and
lacustrine associations of species. Where an island or a reef acts as a partial
dam for the water flowing eastward from the Detroit, Rouge, Raisin and
Maumee Rivers, the rate of water flow increases over and around such partial
barriers, and provides opportunity for a riverine association of organisms to
settle down and thrive.
In addition to the riverine and lacustrine kinds of aquatic ecosystem, a
third major ecosystem type in the region is the coastal wetlands. In Lake
Erie, these were largely located at the mouths of the larger steams, and were
thus a more localized version of estuary than the whole Western Basin.
Because of seasonal meteorological phenomena, the flow of tributaries
increases in spring and water levels in rivers and the lake rise to flood the
coastal wetlands. Such flooding events provide temporary spawning and
nursery habitats for some migratory species of fish (i.e., the northern pike
and muskellunge), at least if the floodwaters are allowed to drain away
gradually as was once the case.
IV.

CATEGORICAL TAXONOMIC DISTINCTIVES VERSUS
FUNCTIONAL INTERRELATEDNESS

In "Nature," we perceive no such things as a straight line, a discrete
boundary, an impenetrable barrier, an enclosed volume, a pure substance, or
a persistent complex of propensities. This may also be true with respect to
"Culture." Any scientific approach, formal convention or legalism that
presupposes the existence of such abstractions will run into difficulties, both
sooner and later.
In the 1730s Carl von Linn6 of Sweden formulated a nested schema of
plant taxonomy that was subsequently extended to animals and other kinds
of organisms. His approach was extremely categorical, starting with an
assumption that any individual living being is a member of a species that, in
turn, was invested with a unique essence due to the direct agency of a
Creator. 12 In the 1850s, the empirical work of Charles Darwin of England
undercut the notion of a permanent unique essence as a categorical
See Carl Linnaeus, at http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/history/linnaeus.html:
Carl Linnaeus, also known as Carl von Linn6 or Carolus Linnaeus, is often called the
Father of Taxonomy. His system for naming, ranking, and classifying organisms is
still in wide use today (with many changes). His ideas on classification have
influenced generations of biologists during and after his own lifetime, even those
opposed to the philosophical and theological roots of his work.

12 See id.
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characteristic of a living thing,1 3 but some other features of the Linnean
taxonomic conventions survived for more than a century after Darwin's shift
from a categorical creational to a functional evolutionary perspective in
science.' 4 Evolutionists are now searching for an alternative scientific notion
to that of species and other designations of 15the nested Linnean taxonomic
schema such as genus, sub-family, andfamily.
With respect to Great Lakes fish, and especially those of the Lake Erie
Basin, taxonomists have never been able to agree fully on how to classify all
the individual fish into uniquely different species. Early efforts of
classification relied on anatomical features of adult fish, 16 only to be
followed later by physiological, ecological, behavioral, developmental,
genetic and genomic criteria.' 7 All of this was based on a working definition
of a species as a population of interbreeding individuals that was genetically
isolated to a certain extent from other populations of interbreeding
individuals. 18 No matter how complex the set of classificational criteria
became, unique objective identification that was satisfactory to all the
relevant scientific experts of the species to which some organisms were
members has proven to be unachievable for a few species flocks in the Lake
Erie Basin.' 9
Taxonomic Distinctiveness in Lake Erie Fish
The fish of Lake Erie can be separated into different piscine families, all
of which have names that end with the suffix -idae; their respective subfamilies have names that end with -inae.20 For example, the Salmonidae or
13 See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY NATURAL SELECTION, OR
PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE, available at
http://www.literature.org/authors/darwin-charles/the-origin-of-species/ (last visited May 21,
2002).
14 See Carl Linnaeus, supra note 11.
15 See, e.g., PHILIP D. CANTINO AND KEVIN DE QUEIROZ, PHYLOCODE: A PHYLOGENETIC
THE

3, available at http://www.ohiou.edu/phylocode/
PhyloCode.pdf.
16 See, e.g., Frank Magallanes, History of Ichthyology, at http://www.angelfire.com/biz/
CODE OF BIOLOGICAL NOMENCLATURE

piranha038/taxon.html (last visited May 30, 2002).
17 See Taxonomy: The Study of Classification, at http://www.learn.co.uk/default.asp
?WCI=Unit&WCU=2808 (last visited Jun. 7, 2002).
18 Note the definition. of "species" in WEBSTER'S, supra note 10, at 1108: "A category of
biological classification . . . comprising [of] related organisms or populations potentially
catable of interbreeding."
See, e.g., DARWIN, supra note 13 ("No one definition [of the term "species"] has as yet
satisfied all naturalists; yet every naturalist knows vaguely what he means when he speaks of a
species.").
20 The terms stock, species, genus, sub-family, and family are all used here in the way that
they have been used in recent decades in Lake Erie. If some quite different convention comes
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salmonid family has two sub-families in the Lake Erie Basin, Salmoninae
and Coregoninae:
"

*

Salmoninae has two native chars (lake trout and brook or
speckled trout), an exotic trout (brown trout) and several exotic
salmon (rainbow trout or steelhead, coho and chinook salmon).
In the Lake Erie Basin the native chars occur as stocks, each with
particular habitat preferences and external features, especially at
spawning time. Such stocks were recognized as different by
informed fishers since time immemorial. For example, a Dr. T.
Garlach built a hatchery in Cleveland in 2the
1850s to rear and sell
1
a particular breed of "prize brook trout.",
Coregoninae has a cluster or swarm of types that includes lake
whitefish, lake herring, cisco or chubs, and round whitefish.
Their commercial value has always differed markedly, with the
relative consumer preference being roughly in the above order.
In contrast, round whitefish may have been tossed back in the
water until recent decades, when they were sold to pet food
manufacturers.22

Interbreeding can occur naturally, or can be induced artificially, among
some species of Salmoninae and Coregoninae, but not between those two
sub-families. Such interbreeding may have been fostered by the ecological
consequences of intense fisheries; we speculate that fixed gear that
intercepted a spawning run captured some fish and delayed others, so that the
surviving spawners of a particular stock may not have arrived on an ancestral
spawning site at the appointed time and may have spawned with another
stock that arrived later through a kind of behavioral capture process that has
been termed "shoal trapping." Also, intense modifications of fish habitat
may have fouled a particular ancestral spawning site, and its spawners may
then have wandered to other sites and mingled with the spawners there.
The reproductive isolation between different stocks of a species was the first

to displace that modified Linnean convention, as now seems likely, then the text above will
need to be translated into that new perspective.

21 See HENRY REGIER ET AL., THE ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE WALLEYE IN

WESTERN LAKE ERIE 31 (Great Lakes Fishery Comm'n, Technical Rep. No. 15, 1969),"
availableat http://www.glfc.org/pubs/TechReports/Trl 5.pdf.
22 Round whitefish have virtually no commercial value unless more desirable fish are
See LARUE WELLS & ALBERTON L. MCLAIN, LAKE MICHIGAN: MAN'S EFFECT ON
NATIVE FISH STOCKS AND OTHER BIOTA 44-46 (Great Lakes Fishery Comm'n, Technical Rep't
scarce.

No. 20, 1973).
23 See REGIER, supra note 21, at 68-69.
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to be seriously impaired, as was observed in Lake Erie in the 19t Century.
Then the reproductive isolation between species within particular genera
within sub-families was reduced. In extreme cases, the reproductive isolation
between genera within sub-families may even be completely disintegrated.
Ecologists expect that overall reproductive success will continue to diminish
as reproductive isolation is broached; interbreeding between stocks within a
species may lead to some impairment of reproductive success, but the
impairment will be less than when different species interbreed.25
What has been said above has a parallel in the Percidae or percid family.
In Lake Erie, the many different percid species, each presumably with a
number of stocks, are separated into three generic types: (1) the yellow
walleye, grey sauger and blue pike or yellow, grey and blue pike-perches; (2)
the yellow perch; and (3) a complex of numerous darters and darter-like
species.
Taxonomic complexities, like those with the Salmonidae and Percidae,
also appear in the Catostomidaeor suckers and red horses; the Cyprinidaeor
carps and minnows; the Esocidae or pike and muskies; and the
Centrarchidae or black bass and sunfish family. Other families, as they
manifest themselves in Lake Erie, appear to be less complex: Acipenseridae
or sturgeons; and Ictaluridaeor catfish and bullheads.
We note in retrospect that attempts to manage the fisheries of Lake Erie,
or anywhere in the Great Lakes Basin, have always been faced with the
intractable problem of identifying the relevant natural and cultural
differences within the fish association. The commercial and recreational
markets both distinguished between qualities of fish at the species level, and
sometimes even at the stock level within species.
Attempts to Manage Distinctiveness
The common, if implicit, management ideal was to try to distinguish these
creatures at the level of a reproductively-isolated stock and manage each
stock in an appropriately sustainable way. Thus, an implicit or explicit
emphasis was on
*
*
*

24
25

ensuring access by a stock to its historic spawning habitat;
protecting the spawning habitat from degradation that would have
threatened healthy incubation and the hatching of eggs;
preventing cultural interference with fish during the several stages of
spawning rituals;
See id. at 67.
See id. at 66-67.
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protecting the nursery habitat for the young; and
preventing deliberate or incidental capture by fishers of juvenile and
sub-adult fish.

This fine-scale approach was always more an ideal than an achievable
reality; it proved to be impracticable because of the interactions of cultural
and natural factors far beyond the purview of fishery managers. Some
informed stakeholders recognized this by the 1850s, and they proposed a
technological fix - fish hatcheries. 26 This "fix" inadvertently contributed to
the broaching of the reproductive isolation between the human-procured
stocks and species to the disadvantage of wild stocks. From 1900 to 1950,
excessive reliance was placed on fish hatcheries; this techno-fix merely
compounded the problem and was subsequently shown to be almost totally
ineffectual.27 Indeed, the overall hatchery program as conducted may have
exacerbated problems with the fisheries.
V.

MORE ON THE ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF
MIGRATORY FISH IN LAKE ERIE

There are few, if any, species of fish in Lake Erie that do not possess an
annual migratory pattern. With some stocks of some species, the spatial
extent of its migration may be a few inches for some species, less than a mile
for others, and the stocks of yet another species may migrate as much as two
hundred miles.2 8 An annual pattern typically includes four main kinds of
habitat each of which has special features that are of limited occurrence in
the waters of the Basin:
1. spawning areas or "grounds" (only one or two species have floating
eggs), on which eggs are deposited and then develop and hatch;
2. nursery areas, where the young have some protection while they are
poorly developed anatomically and/or physiologically and
behaviorally defenseless;
3. feeding area, in which there is abundant food of an appropriate type;
and
4. resting or refuge areas, to which they can escape and survive in a
resting state if and when their preferred habitats become unbearable,
whether due to variances in seasonal temperatures or because of lack
of oxygen in a layer of stratified water.
26 See H.A. Regier & W.L. Hartman, Lake Erie's Fish Community: 150 Years of Cultural
Stresses, 180 SCIENCE 1251 (1973).

27 See, e.g., Regier & Hartman, supra note 26, at
28 See Kay & Regier, supra note 3, at 524.

1251.
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In any particular year within the 19th and 20th Centuries, the relative
sizes of these four kinds of habitat for the most valued species ranged from
quite limited with respect to spawning to somewhat less limited with nursery
to more abundant with feeding and somewhat less abundant with resting
areas. Thus the relative sizes of habitats for a particular species may have
been spawning<nursery<resting<feeding. For most of the valued Great
Lakes stocks, the absolute sizes of the spawning, nursing, and resting
habitats decreased progressively over time until the 1950s, with some
recovery since then. The trend through time with respect to feeding areas
relevant to different valued stocks has been more complex. As a general rule
for fish the world over, extinctions of particular stocks have more often been
caused by inaccessibility, destruction and degradation of habitat (particularly
of spawning and nursery habitats) than by the destructive and excessive use
of fisheries.
Suppose that a fish of a particular stock of, say, lake whitefish matures
sexually to spawn at age 4. The migratory history of it and those fish of its
year class in the population, starting as fertilized eggs, will exhibit the
following season-related sequence in its first five full years of life: spawning,
nursery, feeding, resting; feeding, resting; feeding, resting; spawning,
feeding, resting; and spawning, feeding, resting. (With lake whitefish,
spawning occurs in Fall and Winter, nursery in Spring and Summer, feeding
in Spring, Summer and Fall, and resting in Winter) The survivors of this
particular year class will continue with an annual spawning-feeding-resting
sequence until the last survivor dies. In the absence of human harvests, some
whitefish may have survived to senility and then ceased to spawn.
If a particular lake whitefish stock opted through the evolutionary process
to remain in the Eastern Basin of Lake Erie and its tributaries, the four
habitats would all be in different parts of the Eastern-Basin and tributaries.
In comparison, another stock of lake whitefish that spent the warmest part of
Summer in the deeper, colder waters of the Eastern Basin but then migrated
westward through the Central Basin in fall to reach the Western Basin and
even as far as the Detroit River for spawning in late fall would commence a
reverse migration through the Central Basin in Winter and Spring.29
As mentioned before, there may never have been, and may not now be, a
species of fish that was sedentary to the same locale, say, one acre of lake or
one hundred yards of stream, anywhere in Lake Erie (sculpin near springs in
headwater streams may have been an exception). Within a species, the
preference for specific habitat of post-juvenile fish tends to become narrower
with size and age. This approximate generalization may be consistent with a
29

See id. at 523.
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rule of thumb that juvenile fish tend to have "r" features while old fish tend
to have "K" features, as a version of Theodore Dobzhansky's
generalization. 30 To understand these concepts, we generalize to employ "r"
to include fecund, short-lived, rapidly maturing and small fish, while "K"
includes those which are less fecund, slow-growing, longer-lived, and larger.
Furthermore, there is a very approximate direct relationship, at least in
respect to the fish in the Great Lakes Basin, between the length of an annual
migratory route and the fish's size at sexual maturity.
Within each of a number of families of fish in the Lake Erie Basin there is
a range of species that manifests a vague r to K ecological spectrum. Human
exploiters of fish - anglers, commercial fishers, commercial aquaculturists,
home aquarists and bait fishers - have different preferences that can be
related to particular but overlapping ranges of the K to r spectrum, with the
highest demand for K and the lowest for r. Aboriginal fishers, for example,
may have preferred fish of a size toward the K side of the mid-range between
K and r extremes, regardless of whether the fish was for domestic food,
ceremonial use or trade. So partial separation in the fish-related objects of
interest of different human interest groups can be inferred to provide another
opportunity for "niche differentiation" among those differences.
The stocks in which spawning individuals can be classified as high-K,
large in size and with long migratory routes, are here designated as KLM
stocks. KLM stocks of different families include the following: lake
sturgeon (acipenserid); ling (lotid); lake whitefish, lake trout, steelhead, coho
and chinook (salmonids); common white sucker (catostomid); Asian carp
(cyprinid); walleye (percid); channel catfish (ictalurid); and largemouth and
smallmouth bass (centrarchids).
As a general inference from the above heuristic, the recreational anglers
and their charter boat skippers who are interested in Lake Erie fish tend to
have been the most selectively focused on KLM stocks. Starting in the late19th Century, a gradual process has been underway to legally designate such
stocks as "sport fish ' 31 eventually to be exclusively reserved for anglers.
Presumably, it is just a matter of time until the sturgeon, Asian carp, walleye
and channel catfish are reserved for Aboriginals and anglers. Legal
regulations continue to evolve to relate meaningfully to cultural changes in
how humans with different interests share the attributes of the fish
association and reflect continuing conflicts among these interests.
30

See, e.g., Henry A Regier & James J.Kay, A Heuristic Model of Transformation of the

Aquatic Ecosystems of the Great Lakes - St. Laurence River Basin, 5 J. AQUATIC ECOSYSTEM
HEALTH 3, 9 (1996).
31 See Henry A. Regier & Vernon C. Applegate, Historical Review of the Management
Approach to Exploitation and Introduction in SCOL Lakes, 29 J. FISHERIEs REs. BD. CANADA
683, 688 (1972).
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Furthermore, starting in the mid- 1 9 1h Century, the more responsible
practitioners of commercial fishing and then of recreational angling in the
Lake Erie Basin came to take a direct interest in all the migratory/life history
phases of their preferred fish species. The most assertive anglers have
campaigned to protect "their" sport fish from harvest by Aboriginals and
commercial fishers in all habitats and to protect or rehabilitate the preferred
habitats for reproduction. 32 Since many anglers are credulous about the
potential benefits of the small fish hatchery as a techno-fix for poor stream
quality, they would include in the area to be protected not only areas of
habitat in which a stock may remain for a period of time but also the routes
by which the stock migrates from one habitat to another.
However, a number of Native Reserves located in the watersheds of the
Grand and Thames Rivers possess usufructuary treaty rights in waters in
which Lake Erie KLM stocks once migrated to spawn.33 In some cases,
these rights are some two centuries old. 34 Starting in the mid-20th Century,
certain Aboriginal Tribes and groups of Tribes have acted to re-assert their
treaty rights to capture (for domestic consumption, ceremonial use and
commercial trade) their fair share of fish stocks and species that frequent the
geographically-specified waters of their treaty rights at any time of the year.
Currently, the First Nation with a community on Walpole Island in the St.
Clair River is litigating for recognition of treaty rights to fish in large areas of
waters of southeastern Lake Huron, northwestern Lake Erie and their
connecting and tributary rivers.
With respect to the Lake Erie Basin, there may not be a single case of a
KLM stock that may naturally have limited itself in its migratory wanderings
to the area within a particular state, province or Indian Reserve as designated
formally by inter-jurisdictional boundaries.35 With respect to any particular
stock as such in our Basin, there seems to be no formal, stock-specific
protocol to share the harvests or any other valued features among all the
different kinds of interested humans with some explicit or tacit rights to that
stock.
There is, however, a widely shared if tacit view that the fishers of a
particular jurisdiction in which a stock spawns have a preferential right to a
larger share of the allowable sustainable harvest for that stock than have
32 See HUBERT GALLAGHER & JOHN VAN OOSTEN, INTERNATIONAL BOARD OF INQUIRY FOR
THE GREAT LAKES FISHERIES, REPORT AND SUPPLEMENT

76-77 (1942).

33 See Indian Claims Commission Proceedings (1995), at http://www.indianclaims.ca/

download/icp3_eng.doc.
34

Id.

35 The "inter-jurisdictional boundaries" around an Indian Reserve may imply a set of two
concentric limits: the package of rights and responsibilities is most complete within the core
Reserve itself; in nearby off-reserve waters the rights and responsibilities are less complete
and may relate to sharing usufruct rights with non-Aboriginals.
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fishers of jurisdictions in which that stock may spend other stages of its
migratory life history. Such a special right may be rationalized as a quid pro
quo for other ecosystemic benefits foregone in maintaining an open
migratory route to the spawning areas and preserving the spawning and
nursery habitats in healthy conditions, as such habitats are far less abundant
in the Lake Erie Basin than the feeding and refuge habitats needed along
other stages of the migration route.
Early Conservation Measures
For several centuries now, fishers and their administrators have shared an
ethic, sometimes formalized as law, that one was not to interfere with the part
of the life history (of a year class of a valued stock) that involves the late
stages of migration to the spawning grounds, spawning rituals, and the
habitat of developing eggs. To that end, they determined that fixed fishing
gear should not be set so as to intercept more that a fraction of the returning
run of spawners to the stock's spawning grounds. 36 In streams, any dam
should have fishways that can be ascended by the spawners.3 7 Fishing
directly on the spawning grounds during the spawning process was generally
forbidden outright, except for the Aboriginals, who might spear a few for
ceremonial purposes. 38
In the Lake Erie Basin, spawning-related
conservation practices have always received some attention to the extent that
disruptive activities were sometimes criminalized. However, enforcement of
these laws has generally been lax.39
Another conservation practice relating to spawning and reproduction was
practiced centuries ago in Europe: they did not harvest the fish of a year
class intensively until it had reproduced once or twice successfully. It
happens that fish younger than the age of first reproduction are generally
worth less to commercial fishers than somewhat larger fish. Anglers, too,
prefer larger to smaller fish, at least if they are robustly active. However, the
flesh quality of truly old and senile fish is generally inferior, though their
craggy physiognomies may be quite striking. So a traditional rule of thumb to limit human exploitation to fish that have already had the opportunity to
36 See, e.g., Fisheries Act, ch. LX, § 7(11), 1868 (31 Vict.) S.C. 177, 180 (Can.)
[hereinafter 1868 Act] ("Except in the manner known as fly-surface-fishing with a rod and
line, salmon shall not be fished for ... at any.., salmon leap, nor in any pool where salmon
spawn.").
31 See id., s.12, 1868 S.C. at 182 ("Every dam, slide, or other obstruction across or in any
stream . . . that a fish-pass should exist, [the owner shall provide] a durable and efficient
fishway..."). See also BOGUE, supra note 5, at 175-76.
31 See id., s.7(10), 1868 S.C. at 180 ("No salmon shall be captured within two hundred
yards of the mouth of any tributary creek or stream which salmon frequent to spawn.").
39 See, e.g., BOGUE, supra note 5, at 177.
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reproduce - has been practiced in Lake Erie. This rule has generally been
codified in law, 40 but enforcement has seldom been rigorous.
The construction and maintenance of fish ladders around dams was
attempted for several decades in the late 1 9 th Century. 41 The first half dozen
generations of primitive mill dams were washed out by the intense flooding
that followed upstream agricultural and urban developments in these
tributaries.
However, the first flood-proof dams generally did not
incorporate effective fish ladders into their designs, and the migratory stocks
that had used upstream spawning grounds were informally written off. In
recent decades, many of these obsolete dams have been breaking down or
have been deliberately removed, thus making available old spawning
grounds for exploratory spawners. Unfortunately, the detested sea lamprey
also found suitable spawning grounds in these re-opened streams.
The Use of Fish Hatcheries
Both of the old conservation traditions mentioned above were indirectly
undercut by a rediscovery of fish hatcheries in the 1850s and their
subsequently rapid and continuing technical development. By the end of the
19th Century, these hatcheries were perceived by their protagonists to be a
fully efficacious techno-fix for poor conservation of fish and their habitats.42
With the advent of hatcheries, the barring of fishing on spawning runs ceased
to be a big issue, as fishing on the spawning grounds was seen as a good way
to capture sexually ripe fish to strip for fertilized eggs for the hatcheries.
However, the use of hatcheries as a techno-fix, especially in the Lake Erie
Basin, was mostly an abject failure until late in the mid-20th Century.
Besides failing to preserve valued stocks that were threatened, hatcheries
were used to rear and stock exotic species like the Asian carp that was
quickly perceived as a pest and brought exotic fish diseases into the Basin.43
In addition, the gene structure was altered based on stocking priorities.
Hatcheries gradually became less prominent after 1920, when some 20
hatcheries operated in the Lake Erie Basin; those that survived after 1950
may have done so because of political patronage rather than any conservation
purposes. 44 It should be noted, however, that hatcheries provided for
40 See, e.g., 1868 Act, s.13(9), 1868 S.C. (31 Vict.) at 184.
41 See BOGUE, supra note 5, at 218.
42 See BOGUE, supra note 5, at 57.
43 See H.J. Maclsaac, Biological Invasions in Lake Erie, in STATE OF LAKE ERIE, supra

note 3, at 305, 311.
44 See Regier & Applegate, supra note 31, at 689. ("By 1945 the heart had gone out of the
artificial propagation movement... Hatcheries were quietly closed as politically appropriate
times, though some continued to operate ... long enough to experience revitalization in the
1960s.")
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fisheries to exist in the face of extreme habitat degradation, and today, they
are used to rear threatened and endangered species.
More sophisticated and specialized hatcheries for a few stocks of a few
species were constructed or re-constructed in recent decades. Unlike their
predecessors, their primary purpose was not to mass-rear fry to provide
enough fish for subsequent commercial harvests.4 5
With efforts to
rehabilitate spawning and nursery habitats of valued stocks of indigenous
species, hatcheries obtained new eggs from elsewhere, then hatched and
reared them to a post-fry stage, to create new stocks to replace those lost
decades before. Specialized hatcheries have also served a role for put-growand-take practices with non-native salmonids much favored by some anglers,
found to be a bother by commercial fishers and shunned as offensive by
some Aboriginals.
We infer in retrospect that a century of evolving hatchery technology
before 1950 did, on the balance, more harm than good. Like so many cases
of proffered techno-fixes, the solution became the problem, an environmental
as well as a political one. During the past two or three decades, new
hatcheries are being used to help undo the damage in which earlier hatcheries
were complicit. At least that is the hope of impatient anglers. Their desires
are three-fold: they want lots of sport fish now, they want them to grow large
quickly, and they want them to be indiscriminate with respect to fishing lures
and quickly strike anything that is sent down to them.
What passed for fisheries management in Lake Erie in the 1870s
implicitly relied most strongly on preventing serious interference with
spawning; it was habitat-oriented. Primary reliance then switched to fish
hatcheries, which were closely linked to political patronage in that hatchery
personnel were political appointees in some jurisdictions. Various interest
groups were successful in lobbying for limiting access to particular fish
species in certain times and places through a version of zoning, and this
regime was gradually expanded. Even though the need for command-andcontrol regulations on fishery practices was recognized, progress in this
approach was slow and inconsistent. Meanwhile, pollution of the waters was
being combated mostly from the perspective of the health of humans as being
threatened by contaminated domestic water and fouled beaches.
Along with industrial, transportation and agricultural pollution, all four of
the early fisheries approaches - protecting natural spawning and rearing,
releasing massive amounts of fry from fish hatcheries, regulating proper
fishing practices, and zoning human access to fish - failed to prevent Lake
Erie from sinking into abject ecological degradation by the 1950s. 46 Even if
effective command-and-control regulation had been enacted prior to that
41 See id.
46

See, e.g., Regier & Hartman, supra note 26, at 1252.
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time, the information needed to track the boom-and-bust behaviour of the
stocks of interest - lake herring, blue pike, smelt - was simply not available.
This was a direct result of the weak and informal means of fisheries
management that had emerged with more reliance on tacit collaboration
among different fishers and interest groups.
In the 1950s, the Lake Erie native fish association "hit the wall." Lake
sturgeon, lake trout, lake whitefish, lake herring and blue pike dropped out of
the association entirely or almost entirely. With the exception of the blue
pike,47 all of these native species have been recovering during the past two
decades. Non-native species now part of the Lake Erie association include
smelt, alewife, gobies, carp, goldfish and sea lamprey. None of them in
themselves are now highly valued by all fishery interests; the first two are
valued by salmonid anglers and the next three serve as prey or forage for the
first two, and thus may also be valued by salmonid anglers.48 With the
continuing lack of effective management of the ballast waters of ship vessels
and with climate change and other global threats, it seems likely that more
exotic fish species will find a role in Lake Erie. Based on past experience,
most of these exotics will have undesirable features.
The Degradation of Fish Stocks: A Short History
When Europeans took their first fish from Lake Erie around 1650,49 large
lake trout weighed 75 pounds. Lake trout were not valued by commercial
and artisan fishers as highly as were lake whitefish, 50 because the latter was
easier to preserve to maintain high flesh quality. 5' Also, small whitefish
were found in lake trout stomachs, so the lake trout were excoriated for
preying on the sheep-like whitefish, and calls for efforts to control these
47 The blue pike is believed to be extinct in Lake Erie. See P.A. Ryan et al., Recent Trends
in Fish Populations in Eastern Lake Erie in Relation to Changing Lake Trophic State and
Food Web, in STATE OF LAKE ERIE, supra note 3, at 241, 242. Some scientists, such as Phil
Ryan and colleagues, speculate tentatively that yellow walleye, a close relative of blue pike,
now shows a kind of pelagic behavior different from earlier more benthic walleye and
reminiscent of the blues. So genetic introgression of blues into the walleye may have occurred
about 1960 and some of the genetic evolutionary legacy of blue may still be playing a role in
the Lake Erie fish association.
48 See, e.g., D.W. Einhouse et al., Consumption of Rainbow Smelt by Walleye and
Salmonine Fishes, in STATE OF LAKE ERIE, supra note 3, at 291, 294.
49 Joachim Moenig, The Lake Trout of Lake Erie: A Historical Review 4 (1971)

(unpublished paper, University of Toronto) (on file with the Canada-UnitedStates Law
Journal).
50 BOGUE, supra note 5, at 154.
" All About Fish Oil, at http://www.iherb.com/fishoil.html (the soft, poly-unsaturated fats
of lake trout, now recommended so highly by nutritionists, oxidized quickly to give the flesh a
rancid taste.).
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predators were made. 52 Until the 1870s there was no market for sturgeon
flesh and roe; 53 large sturgeon were so powerful that they tore up nets of
cotton and linen that they encountered and were pests to be caught and
removed with specially-constructed large mesh nets as part of a pest-control
program.5 4 With rising catches through increasing fishing pressure on lake
whitefish due to growing demand in the fish trade, the catch of large
whitefish per commercial net fell, resulting in a commensurate increase in
fishing costs. 55 Beginning in 1876, the abundant lake herring, not previously
valued highly as a food fish, increased in value and became a major target of
commercial fishers.56 With refrigeration and more rapid transport of fish to
market, lake trout became more valuable.57 This process of "fishing-up"
continued without pause until about 1960; by then, the Lake Erie fishery
relied almost entirely on small, short-lived fish. 58 The total catch of fish by
Lake Erie commercial fishers did not decrease over the decades, and the
value of small, short-lived fish gradually increased in the absence of
competition in the market of larger fish of more valued species.
The loss of Lake Erie's rich fish species diversity began as early as 1850s.
Unintentional overfishing was entrained in part by the "common pool,
common property" nature of the magnificent fish resources and the absence
of any well-informed comprehensive governance regime that extended over
all the relevant jurisdictions. Intentional over-fishing of lake trout and
sturgeon, perceived to be pests, was triggered by the ready availability of
higher-valued stocks of lake whitefish when markets were still small and
transport was slow. 59 Other human assaults in the form of pollution from
farming industry and urban settlement added to the lake's destruction.
Thousands of milldams in tributaries blocked the migratory wanderings of
many fish stocks. 60 Direct invasion of exotic species was facilitated through
human-constructed canals and indirect invasion by ships' ballast water. 61
Furthermore, to create new fisheries, fisheries experts deliberately introduced

52 See Moenig, supra note 49.

53 BOGUE, supra note 5, at 158.
54 Regier & Hartman, supra note 26, at 1249.
55 BOGUE, supra note 5, at 151.
56 Id. at 156.
57 See Moenig, supra note 49, at 7.
58

See HARTMAN, supra note 9, at 22; W.J. Christie, The Ecosystem Approach to Managing

the Great Lakes: The New Ideas and Problems Associated With Implementing Them, 26 U.
TOL. L. REV. 279, 281 (1995).
59 See BOGUE, supra note 5, at 158.
60 See id. at 145-146.
61 See H.J. MacIsaac, Biological Invasions in Lake Erie, in STATE OF LAKE ERIE, supra
note 3, at 305, 308.

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:389

Great Lakes, and some of these
some fish species into the inter-connected
62
species eventually became pests.
As close as they were to the hub of spreading canals, railways and roads
of the growing U.S. and Canadian integrated economy, it is not surprising
that Lake Erie and Lake Ontario were already severely damaged by human
enterprise and activity in the 1 9 th Century. The degradation continued until
the mid-20th Century, when much of Lake Erie, especially along the south
shores, had degraded into a slum-like state that has been described as a kind
of ecosystemic "death ' 63 Five decades later, following remediative efforts
that cost billions of dollars, 64 the Lake Erie ecosystem now exhibits some
desirable features that bear some resemblance to those of a century ago, 65
while other features are puzzling and may not be politically acceptable.
The salmonids, and especially lake whitefish, are now more abundant in
Lake Erie than they were some decades ago. Some stocks of lake whitefish
have re-established spawning migrations from the Eastern to the Western
Basins. But the deeper hypolimnetic waters of the Central Basin are again
losing their oxygen in the summer; these "dead zones" presumably pose a
threat to young whitefish migrating from the Western to the Eastern Basin.
In view of society's many and sometimes conflicting goals for Lake Erie,
the current challenges for governance of human interactions with fish in the
Lake Erie Basin are formidable!
VI.

NATURAL AND CULTURAL LAWS

Suppose that a law is a conceptual construct about a feature of perceived
reality that was previously laid down and is currently taken to be fixed.
Based on observation of Nature and an accepted protocol of scientific
practices, a scientist may infer a "natural law" as that scientist's conceptual
construct, and he or she may succeed through appropriate rhetoric to induce
other scientists, and subsequently the laity, to accept the "truth" of that
natural law within some specified context. In parallel, based on observation
of Culture and an accepted protocol of legal practice, a lawyer may infer a
cultural law and may succeed through appropriate rhetoric to induce other
lawyers and the laity to accept the "truth" of that cultural law, within some
specified context.66 At any moment in time, both natural and cultural laws
See id. at 309.
63 See BOGUE, supra note 5, at 26.
62

64

The current estimated cost of cleaning up the Great Lakes is estimated to be at around

$380 million dollars per year. Claudia Copeland, Great Lakes Water Quality: Current Issues,
at http://cnie.org/NLE/ CRSreports/Natural/nrgen- 10.cfm (May 17, 1996).
65 See Regier & Kay, supra note 10, at 3.
66 "Nature" and "Culture" are here taken to be organizational polarities that we invoke
about ourselves, other living things and in all of reality, all as commonly perceived in our part
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act to forestall particular possibilities rather than all possibilities, or to induce
particular actions rather than all actions. For us, there is no conceivable set
of natural and/or cultural laws that could reduce what we perceive as
evolutionary reality, including both living and non-living features, to a
deterministic mechanism.
In both Nature and Culture, what humans with the appropriate inclination
identify as laws may be perceived to enable the emergence of a balance
between rights and responsibilities (freedoms and constraints, privileges and
obligations, egotism and altruism, selfishness and selflessness, inwardlooking and outward-looking, forward-looking and backward-looking) on the
part of all living things, at various levels of systemic organization. Absent
some degree of persistent regularity (due to a compatible set of long-lived
structures, conventions, principles, rules, regulations) and the emergence of
reciprocal complementarity as sketched above, a living cultural or natural
thing could not exist. With appropriate complementarities and regularities on
the part of a living thing in interaction with its environmental habitat or
institutional setting, and other compatible conditions, a living thing may
enjoy health and integrity.
If we perceive that the ultimate realities of both Nature and Culture are
evolving in non-deterministic ways that are not fully foreseeable, then any
law, whether it relates to Nature or Culture or to an interaction of those two
aspects of reality, is a tentative and temporary construct. For example, the
set of organizational laws specific to a particular atmospheric high-pressure
ridge that moves eastwardly over Lake Erie, say, is operative only for a few
days. Another set of laws that guide a particular wave in Lake Erie at the
water surface may persist from the wave's inception on the windward edge
of the lake as it progresses across the lake, perhaps with partial interference
from a wave train due to a prior wind from a different direction, until the
wave dissipates or reflects partially on the leeward edge. Yet another set of
laws (including abiotic, anatomical, physiological, genetic, behavioral)
governs a particular individual lake trout from its stage as a fertilized egg to
its death at whatever age. These three cases relate to features of the Lake
Erie Basin ecosystem, and the set of laws for each derives from the
interaction of cultural and natural polarities - air, water, genome, organism,
population, species, community, sub-ecosystem, et cetera - at all selforganizational levels of this ecosystem.
Some of the more generalized natural and cultural laws that were once
entered into our scientific and legal books were subsequently found to be
of the world. In view of recent scientific and scholarly developments, we personally do not
know how to address the question of whether Nature and Culture differ in essence so that
these poles are forever distinctly different, and proceed here on a pragmatic, working
assumption that the two are complementary.
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faulty or obsolete and were deleted, superceded or simply ignored. More
will be retired and new ones will be added; some of the former will be
resurrected and retired again later. Optimistically we proceed with this line
of argument here with a sense that the natural and cultural laws inferred and
reified with respect to the Lake Erie Basin ecosystem have generally been
increasingly more true than false.
As with our notion of reality, we refer to the term ecosystem as relating to
a complex reality that is never fully fixed. The term does not have a
definitive universalistic meaning but only derives meaning from a particular
context as understood within the particular association or network of users of
that term. For our Lake Erie narrative case study, ecosystem refers to
relevant phenomena studied conventionally and compatibly, inter alia, in
ecology, economics, epidemiology, social geography and participatory
governance. Nowadays, "ecosystem" is widely used by opinion leaders in a
connotation that extends its definition far beyond the meaning given the term
by self-disciplined experts in those specialized fields of study.
Consider the natural and cultural realities of Lake Erie and its hydrogeographic Basin. Both the natural and cultural features of this basin
ecosystem have been changing rapidly in unpredictable ways during the past
two centuries. Regardless of how good our capabilities in natural and social
sciences were or might have been, many of the natural and cultural changes
could not have been predicted on the basis of such ecosystemic science.
New events happened that had never occurred anywhere before, and normal
science is powerless to predict indeterministic innovations, though it may be
able to explicate such phenomena after the fact, as in forensic science.
In the last two centuries, formalized constructs of natural law or cultural
law may have never played a dominant role in the overall "governance" of
the natural and cultural ecosystemic phenomena involved in the interactions
between mobile humans, vagile creatures and fugitive lifeless things within
any particular jurisdiction within our Basin - or so it seems to us in
retrospect. Both the natural and cultural features related to such hunting,
fowling and fishing have been evolving and adapting rapidly in ways that
have been so new, complex and transient that they out-stripped the slower
due process conventions through which the scientific and legal professions
infer, accept and reify natural and cultural laws. Natural and cultural realities
have been emerging too swiftly for the normal pace of the formalization of
ecosystemic insights; this would have happened regardless of the level of
funding that might have been made available to scientists and lawyers. Such
rapid evolutionary change creates new realities and thus new ignorances
about emergent reality; currently our ignorance may be increasing more
rapidly than our understanding.
However spotty the governance process may have been, the hunting,
fowling and fishing conducted in the Lake Erie Basin appears never to have
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been so unacceptable that they triggered widespread political uproar among
the general populace of any of the relevant jurisdictions. Many conflicts
festered and occasionally erupted with respect to opportunistic harvesting of
non-sedentary resources between states and between nations that share the
area of this Basin. Occasionally a conflict triggered discrete involvement by
diplomats, measured participation by a country's coast guard, and limited
police action.67 Sometimes a shared legal commitment was enforced through
coordinated action of law enforcement officers from a number of
jurisdictions. 68 There were many incidents of "friction" concerning migratory
fish, but these were not simply "smoothed over" through invocation and
imposition of detailed, formalized versions of trans-boundary natural or
cultural laws.
So how have hunting, fowling and fishing for migratory animals been
governed in the Lake Erie Basin? A kind of shared folk wisdom seems to
have pervaded human denizens of this Basin. We have tried to protect the
natural generative processes of valued "natural resources;" furthermore, we
have tried to prevent the cultural generative processes of things that harm
valued living and non-living things. Over the many decades we have moved
the main focus of our management activities to the immediate realities of the
inception of the relevant goods and bads as is consistent with an implicit
"precautionary principle., 69 Fortunately, the acts of inception of goods and
bads tend to be localized spatio-temporally and such generative locales can
readily be discovered and are therefore amenable to protective, remediative
and preventive intervention by informed humans. Unfortunately, this kind of
natural/cultural folk wisdom did not suffice to forestall the severe ecosystem
degradation of Lake Erie and its Basin, though it may have helped to
postpone by some decades (perhaps from the 1930s to the 1950s) the evil day

67

One such instance was the "Pelee Island incident" of May 8, 1894, wherein Captain

Edward Dunn of the Canadian patrol ship Petrel arrested approximately 50 wealthy American
businessmen for fishing in Canadian waters without licenses. Each vessel was subsequently
fined $40, plus costs. BOGUE, supra note 5, at 231. In contrast, the American tug Grace was
seized for fishing off the Canadian coast; this incident led to the involvement of the U.S.
Department of State and the British Foreign Office. After prolonged litigation, damages were
paid to the owners of the vessel. Id.
68 See, e.g., BOGUE, supra note 5, at 310.
69 The "precautionary principle" encapsulates the idea, as stated in the 1992 Rio
Declaration, that "[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation." Report of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Annex I, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl51/ aconf 15126-1 annex 1.htm (last visited May 18,
2002) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
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of the collapse of particular fish species and of the valued healthy
manifestation of the Lake Erie ecosystem.
VII.

RIGHTS AND WRONGS

Since time immemorial, self-organized entities in Nature and Culture
have balanced inward-facing with outward-facing or looking into the past
and looking into the future in a way that Arthur Koestler characterized as
Janus-like. 70 Recent scientific studies of evolution have corroborated what
has been argued for a century now: that which may be perceived by a
superficial glance as selfishness and selflessness are equally natural as well
as being cultural with respect to human interactions. 7 1 External disciplinary
action may be helpful in correcting unbalanced cases of selfishness and
perhaps also of selflessness. From an ecosystemic perspective, we perceive
no sharp distinction or boundary between these complementarities.
Consider an area of private property or of legal jurisdiction each with
legally-drawn, sharply-specified boundaries. Many desirable goods and
services and many -undesirable bads and disservices in natural/cultural
ecosystems pay little heed to the existence of sharply drawn boundaries
around some spatial property or jurisdiction. Natural goods and services
include such things as clean air and water as well as valued creatures such as
fish and birds. Natural bads/disservices include poisons in air and water and
in the flesh of edible creatures. For many fishers, cultural goods and services
include relatively selective biocides to control the exotic sea lamprey and
cultural bads/disservices include toxic wastes from industry, including the
hazardous contaminants released in the wastes of companies that carelessly
produce desirable biocides.
A private property owner owns a bundle of rights and responsibilities that
are specified formally only in part. An owner of property or an administrator
of a jurisdiction ultimately has no choice: some of both the benefits of goods
and services and the costs of bads or disservices, whether natural or cultural,
must be shared with other "stakeholders." There are choices on how sharing
will happen. If it is done fairly (with "due process") then the negotiation and
administration costs (that is, the transaction costs) incurred to achieve the
agreed balance between rights and responsibilities may be "manageable."
However, institutional and bureaucratic inertia, which tend to be high,
generally do not adapt as quickly as ecosystem processes. In practice,
democracies may adapt appropriately more rapidly to such challenges than
other forms of government. Nevertheless, democracies have experienced
See, e.g., Regier & Kay, supra note 10, at 12.
71 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1989); Ernst Mayr, Darwin's
Influence on Modern Thought, 283 SCIENTIFIC AM. 78 (2000).
70
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great difficulties in achieving a lasting balance in any particular case with an
aquatic ecosystem. The mix of goods and services and bads or disservices
has been evolving so rapidly that it exceeds the tempo of the information
services - science and scholarship, as in the preceding section above - and
the appropriate governance process to allocate the goods and bads among all
stakeholders. Also, the effects of new goods and bads may interact with
effects of the old goods and bads to change important features of the latter,
thus requiring re-allocation of the old goods and bads.
The allocation of a culturally-created "bad" has increasingly focused
on forcing the creator of the "bad" to internalize the remediation costs as
a part of the innovator's normal responsibility that is consistent with both
a precautionary principle and notions of fairness.
This may be a
complement to the practice of patenting a culturally-created good in order
to permit capture of much of the benefit by the innovator as a part of an
innovator's normal right. Unless fishers conscientiously employ "good"
fishing practices, fish and their habitat are harmed in ways that are difficult
to document. Careless or poorly-informed fishers who are trying to shave
short-term costs are unlikely to volunteer information about their own
destructive practices. But even careful fishers may resist providing clear
information on their fishing practices when they are engaged in
competitive fishing because they perceive their future success to hinge on
secrecy or a monopoly of such understanding. Few fishers happily
welcome an objective sampler on their trips when fishing competitively.
With respect to the management of human uses of natural resources, a
simplistic and partial understanding of frequently-experienced difficulties
was exaggerated by Garrett Hardin in 1968 as a tragedy of the commons.72
Using many historical and contemporary case studies, Hardin showed that a
"tragedy of the commons" could occur when a "resource" (e.g., harvestable
yield of goods, assimilative capacity for bads) is freely accessible and open
to use by anyone. 73 But such extreme openness was not a common
occurrence historically in natural/cultural ecosystems anywhere in the world.
The socio-ecologists corrected some of the shortcomings of Hardin's rather
generalized description, etiology and corrective treatment and provided cases
of a comedy of the commons. 74 But the socio-ecologists' contributions have
been less appealing to neo-liberal conservatives with an urge to privatize than
was Hardin's original piece. So Hardin's "tragedy" continues in the form of
misinformation or disinformation in some political circles. Ill-informed
72

See generally G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).

73 See Thomas Dietz et al., The Drama of the Commons, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 3, 3-4 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002).
74 See id. at 4.
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privatization may entrain unbearably high transaction costs, which a private
property owner may try to externalize unfairly to others. Elinor Ostrom and
others now include consideration of both tragedies and comedies in their
study of commons-oriented governance regimes, and refer to a balanced
approach as a drama of the commons.75
Processes of allocation of goods and bads among stakeholder humans and
other creatures permeate all of Nature and Culture and must be addressed
systemically. No technical legal fixes or silver bullets will suffice in specific
cases, let alone in generic ones. And no universalistic systemic solutions to
this issue will be found, if reality is perceived as a complex of evolving
living things in a four-dimensional, nested spatio-temporal mosaic. But a set
of partial guidelines to a balance of rights and responsibilities can perhaps be
inferred for different classes of ecosystemic phenomena. In practice, such
guidelines depend on both a priori deontological and a posteriori
consequentialist ethical principles as well as on esthetic and spiritual
considerations. Such considerations are seldom teased apart in the course of
decision-making; instead, a kind of decent pragmatism tacitly subsumes
them. We proceed here in such a pragmatic if optimistic way.
VIII. FORMAL LEGAL STRUCTURES AND
PROCESSES CURRENTLY IN PLACE FOR THE PROTECTION
OF LAKE ERIE FISH
One of the most significant challenges for managing the Laurentian Great
Lakes derives from interests of the multiple jurisdictions with authority and
control over them. The set of actors is different for each lake. Lake Erie
presents perhaps the most interesting and challenging case because four state,
one provincial, and two national, and a multitude of local and municipal
governments all play roles in regulating this water body.76 (Aboriginals of
both the Anishinabek and Haudenosaunee cultures may be reinstituting old
confederacies and governance related to fishing rights that they are gradually
re-asserting.)77 Myriad agencies, from the local level to the binational, seek
to regulate particular pieces of activity, from resource harvesting to pollution
discharge to recreational practice to environmental conservation. Ferreri and
Taylor observe that the large number of entities with overlapping authority
over some of the Basin create "jurisdictional stress," that stands as a

75

THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note

73.

76 The states and provinces involved in Lake Erie governance are: Pennsylvania, New

York, Ohio, Michigan, and Ontario.
77

See, e.g., UNITED ANISHNAABEG COUNCIL, ANISHNAABE GOVERNMENT: AGREEMENT-IN-

PRINCIPLE 35, § 5.14.1 (g) (1998), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/anagcv-e.pdf.
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"formidable obstacle to consensus building."78 This challenge can be seen in
the earliest attempts a collaborative management. According to Francis and
Regier:
At the institutional level, there have been impressively long lead times
between some first expressions of need for new institutions and their
eventual creation ...A first call for the St. Lawrence Seaway came
from an 1894 waterways conference, and 65 years later a binational
agreement was reached to construct it. In contrast, the Boundary
Waters Treaty came about in a record time of about 15 years (i.e.,
between the first call for some such agreement at an 1894 irrigation
conference and the signing of the treaty in 1909.)' 9
Calls for some kind of fisheries agreement for the Great Lakes, which
would have included the authority to develop and enact fisheries rules that
would be uniformly implemented and enforced throughout the Great Lakes
Basin, date back to 1875. 80 Indeed, twenty-seven commissions and
conferences were convened to study the matter over an 80-year period prior
to the establishment of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission in 1955.81 The
first interstate conference took place in Detroit in 1883.82 The assembled
representatives put forward 13 recommendations, but none of them were
adopted.83 The first international gathering was held in New York City in
1891.84 Much work was done to formulate regulations to protect the lakes'
fisheries, but85again, neither the States nor the Province of Ontario adopted
any of them.
Meanwhile, as these policy coordination efforts went on, enforcement
vessels began to take up Canadian boundary enforcement very seriously.
However, the huge number of American commercial operators fishing in
Canadian waters ("poachers") simply overwhelmed the patrol boats' ability
to deter illegal activity. Beginning in 1888, Canada posted patrol boats in
Lake Erie to confiscate gear used by Americans illegally fishing in the less78

C. Paola Ferreri, William W. Taylor & John M. Robertson, Great Lakes Fisheries

Futures: Balancing the Demands of a Multijurisdictional Resource, in

GREAT LAKES
FISHERIES POLICY AND MANAGEMENT: A BINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 539, 545 (William W.

Taylor & C. Paola Ferreri eds., 1999).

George R. Francis & Henry A. Regier, Barriersand Bridges to the Restoration of the
Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS
AND INSTITUTIONS 281 (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995).
so See GALLAGHER & VAN OOSTEN, supra note 32, at 102.
S1 Francis & Regier, supra note 79.
82 See BOGUE, supra note 5, at 184.
83 See GALLAGHER & VAN OOSTEN, supra note 32, at 30.
84 See BOGUE, supra note 5, at 193.

.s See id.
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intensively fished Canadian waters.86 First, the Cruiser attempted to run
down lawbreakers and confiscate their nets and gear, 87 but it was too slow
and was replaced in 1894 by the Petrel, commanded by Captain Edward
Dunn. 88 A determined sort of a man, he confiscated hundreds of illegal nets
annually, but opined that it was a mere "drop in the bucket.",8' The
Americans were apparently quite clever in outmaneuvering the single
enforcement vessel. The Vigilant, faster still, replaced the Petrel in 1905 and
was also commanded by Captain Dunn. 90 When a collision occurred with a
miscreant boat, two American lives were lost.9' This loss seemed to bring
about a reduction in illegal activity. The American government then added
its weight by contributing a revenue cutter to track offenders.9 2 The Canadian
agents' enforcement arsenal was further strengthened when, in 1907, they
were finally given authority to arrest offenders.93
In 1908, the U.S. and Great Britain (acting for the Dominion of Canada)
drafted a treaty to regulate the boundary waters fisheries and to create an
international fisheries commission. 94 Initially conceived of as a joint
regulatory authority with rulemaking powers, the final fisheries-related
product called for a "draft-and-recommend" process.95 Even that was too
much for some powerful parochial fisheries' interests. The treaty never went
into effect, and the draft was eventually set aside.96 Habitat, biological
diversity, and Water quality all continued to worsen.
Another attempt to join the countries in fisheries management was
undertaken in 1946 in the Convention between the United States of America
and Canada for the Development, Protection and Conservation of Fisheries
of the Great Lakes. 97 It too failed when the U.S. Senate did not ratify it.98 In
retrospect, we can wonder whether the inter-jurisdictional attempts sketched
above would have worked well in practice. They may have implicitly
Id. at 308.
87 See id. at 217-218.
88 See id. at 70-71.
86

'9
90

id. at 309.
BOGUE, supra note 5, at 309.

9' Id at
92

309-310.

See id. at 310.

13 See id.

94 See id. at 192-93.

9' Id. at313.
96 See Margaret Ross Dochoda & Michael L. Jones, Managing Great Lakes Fisheries
Under Multiple and Diverse Authorities, in SUSTAINING NORTH AMERICAN SALMON:

PERSPECTIVES ACROSS REGIONS AND DISCIPLINES 221, 225 (Catherine W. Mecklenburg, T.
Anthony Mecklenburg & Lyman K. Thorsteinson eds., 2002); BOGUE, supra note 5,at 192193.
97 Id.
98 See id.
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assumed unrealistic regularities and predictabilities in the fish association
and aquatic ecosystem. Francis and Regier, to wit:
It becomes highly speculative to consider what it would take to make
the entire institutional and organizational overlay for the Great Lakes
Basin ecosystem functionally compatible with the dynamics of the
ecosystem.
The continual appearance and accumulation of
"environmental problems" can be seen as symptoms of systemic
dysfunctionalism in the relationship among society and ecosystem.
The adaptive changes required can be specified only in general terms,
such as the restoration and maintenance of ecosystem integrity and an
ecologically sustainable society. 99
The speed at which these biological systems change greatly exceeds the
rate of change in political, or at least in bureaucratic, systems. Efforts have
nonetheless been made to adapt rules and institutions.
In 1954, with the lakes in a dire environmental condition (extinct stocks,
exotic invasions, pollution, and bankruptcy of some fisheries) resulting in
severe social disruption, the U.S. and Canada signed the Convention on
Great Lakes Fisheries, 00 which authorized the creation of the Great Lakes
Fishery Commission (GLFC).01°
The GLFC's mission consists of sea
control, 0 2

lamprey

research, 10 3

and

coordination

among

regulatory

°4

agencies, leaving the mission of hands-on fish
regulation and management
10 5
to individual state and provincial jurisdictions.
IX.

CURRENT LAKE ERIE FISHERIES GOVERNANCE

We perceive an illusion of governmental control, ostensibly science-based
and utilizing knowledge of expert scientists and technicians who have the
confidence of the governance network. All participants in the decisionmaking process share a general commitment to "adaptive management" and
to expect the unexpected. 0 6 Management tends to focus on fisheries issues
99 Francis & Regier, supra note 80, at 281.
1oo Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, Sept. 10, 1954, U.S.-Can., 6 U.S.T. 2836, T.I.A.S.
3326, availableat http://www.glfc.org/pubs/conv.htm (last visited May 17, 2002).
'o' Id., art. II10).
102
103

'o4

'0

Id., art. IV(d).
Id., art. IV(a).
Id., art. IV(b).
Id., art. X.

106 See George Francis, Flexible Governance, in AN EcosYsTEM APROACH TO THE
INTEGRITY OF THE GREAT LAKES IN TURBULENT TIMES 195, 195-96 (Clayton J. Edwards &

Henry A. Regier eds., 1988) (Great Lakes Fishery Comm'n Spec. Pub. No. 90-04), available
at http://www.glfc.org/pubs/SpecialPubs/Sp90_4.pdf.
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in "real time" in that harvest levels and allocations are assessed and fixed
with respect to "inventory" that is already in the lake, as young-of-year and
juvenile fish are assiduously monitored. The approach consists mostly of
"virtual population analysis" where the "virtual" means that it not based on
"real" data but on some "less-than-real" assumptions on population
dynamics. The precautionary principle is invoked, apparently, and not in a
formal way tactically or strategically.
Canada
North of the border, the legal basis for "fisheries management" continues
to be unresolved, both in theory and in practice. A key document, drafted in
the 1890s, that proposed the devolution of some of the governance
responsibilities for fisheries from the federal to the provincial level was
apparently lost soon after its writing; merely a passing reference to it in
another document is used as the legal basis for whatever was in that missing
document. The Canadian federal, Ontario provincial, and the Quebec
"national" governments, and the two implicit confederations of Aboriginal
peoples -

Anishinabek and Haudenosaunee -

each have a different

understanding of this federal-to-provincial devolution. 10 7 These interjurisdictional differences, which go back more than a century, have not been
resolved, and there does not seem to be a political will at this point in time to
sort them out.
In the mid-1980s, with the concurrence from the federal Canadian
government, the Conservative Ontario government of the time instituted a
system of "individual transferable quotas" (ITQs) for the commercial
fisheries in the Great Lakes. 108 It was implemented in steps over a number of
years, starting with Lake Erie because fishers in that lake had already been
moving voluntarily in that general direction. At that time the commercial
fishers did not welcome ITQs fully, and imposed three conditions on the
government in exchange for their compliance: (1) that final decision-making
on certain legal issues with regards to commercial fisheries should not be
devolved from the Ontario Minister's office; (2) that more reliable estimates
be inferred for total allowable catches (TACs); and (3) that legal enforcement
be strict but fair and more overt than was previously done. The government
did not fully meet those conditions during the ITQ's imposition. Subsequent
New Democrat, Liberal, and another conservative government continued the
107

See Henry Regier, An Emerging Fisheries Issue in Ontario: Governance or What? in

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, REPORT OF A MAY 14, 1999 WORKSHOP
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN ONTARIO 48, 51 (Environmental Monograph No.

ed., 1999), availableat http://www.utoronto.ca/env/em- 15.pdf.
108 Id.
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devolution, as various aspects of the administration of these fisheries,
especially those related to data collection, were given over to organized
groups of commercial fishers. However, no public assessment has been
made of how this overall process of combined use of a market mechanism
with devolution of administrative responsibilities with the commercial
fisheries has played out to date. In the meantime, researchers serving the
interests of Aboriginal First Nations have emphasized inequities in all of this
privatization process, especially with respect to Aboriginal fishers; some
half-hearted efforts have been able to blunt those inequities.
Meanwhile the Canadian and Ontario governments drafted an ad hoc
Canada-Ontario agreement concerning administration of fisheries in the late
1980s. 10 9 However, it lapsed in the 1990s with a series of events that could
have provided grist for several episodes of the satirical CBC TV series, the
0
A new Canada-Ontario agreement may
Royal Canadian Air Farce."1
currently be in the negotiation stage.
The Canada Fisheries Act,"' now about 150 years old, includes two
2
sections on fish habitat: one on water quality' 1 and one on water quantity. 13
As with fishing, per se, the federal and Ontario provincial governments have
been fiddling - politically, bureaucratically and legally - with these two
sections for over a century and cannot seem to get it right. The water quality
sections 1 4 have been delegated, more or less, to Environment Canada (EC).
EC, in turn, has temporarily delegated parts of the water quality section to the
Ontario Ministry of the Environment (MOE) under occasional five-year
arrangements called Canada-Ontario Agreements (COAs), focusing its own
efforts on Canadian commitments under the binational Agreement for Great
Lakes Water Quality (GLWQA)." 5 A new COA is being negotiated in 20012002 and may be endorsed formally in 2002;116 its main point seems to be

109 That is, the 1988 Canada-Ontario Fisheries Agreement.
110 Royal CanadianAir Farce (CBC television broadcast series, 1993- ). The RCAF is a
comedy show composed of vignettes; it is currently the highest-rated TV show on the CBC.
For more information, go to http://airfarce.coninfo/history.html (last visited May 17, 2002).
11 Fisheries Act, ch. LX, 1868 S.C. (31 Vict.) 177 (Can.) [hereinafter 1868 Act]. See also
Fisheries Act, R.S. ch. F-14 (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter 1985 Act]. The 1868 Act has never
been repealed.
112 See 1868 Act, s.14, 1868 S.C. at 184-185.
13 Seeid.,s.12,1868S.C.at 182.
114 See 1985 Act, ss.35-43.
115 Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, U.S.-Can., April 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 301,

amended Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383, amended by Protocol, Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No.
11,551 [hereinafter GLWQA].
116 See Environment Canada, The Draft New Canada-OntarioAgreement Respecting the
Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem, at http://www.on.ec.gc.ca/coa/2001/intro-e.html
May 20, 2002).
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that further implementation of the GLWQA should proceed only partially
and gradually.17
The watersheds of the more inhabited parts of Ontario all have
"conservation authorities" (CAs), that were created by the provincial
government mostly in the 1950s to help municipalities cope with joint
concerns about water: flooding hydrology, water for domestic and
recreational use, and reforestation of sandy moraines and plains to protect
aquifers. 1 8 The CAs may all own and administer dams for purposes of
domestic and recreational water supplies as well as for flood control; very
few of these dams have effective fish ladders. These CAs, and the
municipalities that they serve, have always been torn between proconservation and pro-development interests. With some exceptions, the CAs
did not welcome the GLWQAs of 1972,1978 or 1987, and some may have
deliberately chosen not to cooperate under those agreements. Some have
polluted "hot spots" that were never formally designated as Areas of
Concern. The pro-development forces were clearly dominant in the 1980s
and 1990s, but some balance may be re-emerging. In recent years, a few
CAs have become active in the Remedial Action Planning and the
implementation of the plans for Areas of Concern in their watersheds.
In the 1990s, Fisheries and Oceans Canada negotiated to devolve some
responsibilities related to water quantity aspects of fish habitat to the CAs,"1219
without offering adequate financial resources for these purposes. 0
Furthermore, Environment Canada and Ontario's Ministry of the
Environment may devolve some responsibilities related to water quality
aspects of fish habitat to the CAs, presumably again with inadequate transfer
of financial resources. Meanwhile, it is not clear how the CAs will balance
their under-financed new pro-conservation responsibilities with a continuing
pro-development emphasis by municipalities.
In the late 1990s, Ontario's Conservative government started to devolve
self-management and/or privatization to other sectors of the fisheries besides
117 See ENVIRONMENT CANADA, CANADA-ONTARIO AGREEMENT RESPECTING THE GREAT

(2001), available at http:llwww.
on.ec.gc.ca/coa/agreement-pdf/fa-e.pdf (last visited May 20, 2002) ("Implementation of this
Agreement will contribute to meeting Canada's obligations under the [GLWQA].").
118 The Conservation Authorities Act, which gives the power for the Ontario provincial
government to protect watershed resources using regional "conservation authorities," was
enacted in 1946. See Conservation Ontario, Corporate Profile, at http://www.conservationontario.on.ca/profile/profile.htm (last visited May 20, 2002).
119See Regier, supra note 107, at 49; Lakehead Conservation Authority, New Fisheries
Agreement, at http://www.lakeheadca.comy98fish.htm (last visited May 31, 2002).
120 See Margaret Ross Dochoda, Authorities, Responsibilities and Arrangements for
LAKES BASIN ECOSYSTEM: DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 4

Managing Fish and Fisheries in the Great Lakes Ecosystem, in GREAT LAKES FISHERIES
POLICY AND MANAGEMENT,

supra note 78, at 93, 95.
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the commercial fishers: bait; aquaculture; outfitters and fishing lodges;
recreational angling; and fish hatcheries for stocking purposes. Some weak
co-management agreements between particular First Nations and the Ontario
regime are coming into place. 121 But there are still some important questions
that need to be asked: is any or all of this devolution informed by any insight
into what has gone before? Is it proceeding on the assumption that all of
these kinds of fisheries are ecologically, economically and culturally
independent so that each can operate independently of all the rest? Who
knows? To make progress, more studies are needed to help us better
understand the interactions between societies, ecosystems, and the fisheries.
If some governance trends of the 1990s continue in Ontario, then both the
water quality and quantity aspects of the fish habitat will be delegated in part
to the Conservation Authorities. Concurrently, some administrative aspects
of the harvest and culture of fisheries will be devolved to organized interest
groups, perhaps some six in all. The marketplace is coming to be used
increasingly for allocation of the relevant resources to duly licensed
entrepreneurs. How these will all relate to the governance of Lake Erie
fisheries as such may have been given little or no consideration. The
interactions among all these kinds of fish-related interests may be too
complex for rationalistic bureaucratic decisionmaking with command-andcontrol regulations, even if that approach were not already obsolete for other
reasons. A process, or a suite of processes, of participatory democratic
decisionmaking to resolve conflicts by representatives from each group of
stakeholders, has not been initiated.
The United States
The situation on the U.S. side of the border has been and continues to be
even more complicated, largely because of the much larger number of
jurisdictions involved. The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
declares that those powers not given to the U.S. are reserved to the states
(and "to the people") 122 and those "reserved" powers would presumably
121 See Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy, at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/FISH

MAN/AFSe.htm (last visited May 25, 2002).
122 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. But certain constitutional powers dealing with interstate
commerce and the formation of treaties still lie with the federal government. Consider this
statement from a letter by a member of the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Legal
Advisor:
Article 1, Section 10 [of the U.S. Constitution] does not.., prohibit U.S. States from
coordinating their legitimate regulatory authorities in a non-binding manner with those
of a neighboring nation or province, especially where such coordination does not
impinge on the authority or the foreign relations of the United States.
Dochoda & Jones, supra note 96, at 230. Note also that
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include fisheries management. So, in addition to the federal government,
eight states 123 have a measure of sovereignty over a portion of Great Lakes'
waters and shoreline. We begin this discussion with a taste of relevant
history.
In addition to the power of the Tenth Amendment, the American freemarket capitalist paradigm resulted in the continuation from settlement times
of open access to unregulated fisheries, long past the time when it was clear
that regulation was desperately needed to conserve them. From the early
days, the states made it clear that they were the primary authorities when it
came to fisheries governance.12 4 While the states were unambiguous in their
position that they were in charge of the fisheries, they were mostly happy to
participate in federally-sponsored hatchery programs because they saw
benefits (more fish) with minimal concomitant burdens. Even so, in the
1890s, Michigan prohibited federal collection of spawn for the hatcheries
125
program, and state law enforcement agents arrested federal employees.
From then into the modern era, until the new approach adopted through
the implementation of the 1981 Strategic Great Lakes Fisheries Management
Plan, the management framework in Lake Erie was piecemeal: Michigan,
New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania regulated fisheries in their own waters
with their own rules and regulations. Likewise on the Canadian side, Ontario
also regulated its own fisheries with its own set of rules. Each jurisdiction's
regime included a mix, always with some idiosyncratic features, on
limitations on entry, assigned fishing zones, season restrictions, gear
126
restrictions, bans on catching sport species, catch quotas, and the like.
Some coordination did occur in close seasons in some years, but it was rather
informal.
As stocks of commercially valuable species in the various lakes
"crashed," a shift from a primary emphasis on commercial to recreational
fishing took place. Michigan's Department of Natural Resources led the
change in the mid-1960s. Other states followed suit, and by the end of the
1970s, the new fisheries management priority was in place in all U.S. waters
of the Great Lakes.
[elven then, the U.S. constitution does not guarantee that commitments embedded in
legally blinding conventions will always take precedence over domestic laws . . .
Small wonder, then, that many other countries find the United States a difficult partner
when it comes to the creation and implementation of international regimes.
Oran R. Young, Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale
Interactions,in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 73, at 263, 277
123 Those states are: Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and New York.
124 BOGUE, supra note 5, at 184, 311.
125 id.
126 See, e.g., id. at 180.
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U.S. anglers have been much more active with respect to the percids than
their Canadian counterparts, likely a function of the larger number of anglers
in the U.S. and the value they place on fishing. Anglers supported the
creation of a recreational fishery of non-native salmon, while the commercial
fishers preferred rehabilitation of native lake whitefish and lake trout. As
politically-powerful anglers have successfully suppressed commercial
fisheries on walleye and yellow perch within the large shallow bays of the
other lakes in recent decades, regulation concerning fisheries in Lake Erie
soon followed in that direction.
In the late 1970s, until 1985, Michigan's Fisheries Division (MFD)
devoted substantial energy to litigation and negotiation on the subject of
Native fishing rights under the 1836 Treaty between the United States and
the Chippewa and Ottawa Nations.12 7 When a negotiated and court-ordered
settlement between the state, the federal government and three tribes was
reached in 1985, the Michigan waters of Lakes Huron and Michigan were
128
divided into zones in an effort to separate tribal and recreational fishers. 29
Catch quotas were set for tribal subsistence and commercial fishers.'
Licensing, harvest quotas, and gear restrictions for all other fishers are set by
the MFD. 13 ° Additional energies were consumed in the late 1990s while the
agreement was under renegotiation. A new framework was agreed to late in
2000.131 Division staffers are now involved in preparing for inland hunting,

127

See generally Treaty of 1836, supra note 6. But see also People v. LeBlanc, 248

N.W.2d 199 (Mich. 1976). In LeBlanc, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the lower-court
ruling that convicted a full-blooded Indian of fishing without a commercial license and with
fishing with a prohibited gill net. The court ruled that that conviction for fishing without a
commercial license could not stand because it interfered with his fishing rights under the
Treaty of 1836, and that the conviction for using a gill net could stand only if prohibition
against use of gill nets was necessary for environmental protection purposes and did not
discriminate against treaty Indians.
Further, in U.S. v. Michigan, 471 F.Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), remanded by 623 F.2d
448 (6 h Cir. 1980), reheard on remand, 520 F.Supp. 207 (W.D. Mich. 1981), the Court
scolded the State of Michigan for attempting to over-step the treaty by implementing and
enforcing its own fishing regulations in ways that nullified the treaty. The justices held that
such regulations and laws that interfered with Native fishing rights under the Treaty were null
and void. For further case law, see, e.g., Attorney General v. Hermes, 339 N.W.2d 545 (Mich.
Ag . 1983); People v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539 (1971).
2 See, e.g., MICHIGAN PUBLIC INFORMATION & EDUCATION COMMITTEE, MICHIGAN'S 1836
TREATY FISHERY GUIDE

5 (1999), availableat http://www.glifwc.org/publications/guide.pdf.

129 See generally U.S. v. Michigan, No. M-26-73 (W.D. Mich. filed Jun. 11, 1985) (consent

decree).
130 See id.
131 See Jennifer Dale, 1836 Tribes, Michigan Negotiate New Great Lakes Fishing
(last
Agreement, at http://www.glifwc.org/publications/winterO0/fishing-agreement.htm
visited May 22, 2002). See also 1836 Consent Agreement Press Release (Aug. 7, 2000), at
http://www.dnr.state.mi.us/Sublndex.asp?LinklD=369&Sec=fish (last visited May 25, 2002).
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fishing, and gathering rights litigation, as it is anticipated that suit will be
filed in the near future (a draft complaint is being circulated).
As progress is made on one front, however, protection of the fisheries is
losing ground elsewhere. Michigan's situation stands as an example of the
management approach employed by the Lake Erie states. For example, the
MFD is now faced with its second significant staff cutback in five years. In
1997 it lost 17% of its staff, all experienced professionals, through an early
retirement program.' 32 It is anticipated that a recently-announced early
13
retirement option will reduce the staff by at least another 10%. 1
Furthermore, it would be difficult to find someone in the natural resources
community who disagreed with the observation that 11 years under Governor
John Engler has brought greatly diminished environmental regulation
generally. For example, while all other states issued fish advisories related to
hazardous contaminants in fish flesh, Governor Engler fought them, fearing,
it is supposed, damage to the state's tourism industry. 134 Early in his tenure,
he split the regulatory agency, the Department of Natural Resources, placing
the policy making and permitting offices directly under his control in the new
Department of Environmental Quality. 35 According to a study done by the
Lone Tree Council, almost no wetland-filling permits were denied during this
period, making the Michigan Wetlands Protection Act 136 ineffective at best,
and a mockery at worst. Similarities can be seen in the other states and
Ontario during this time frame, suggesting that the Great Lakes Basin and its
fisheries are not adequately protected.
Joint Governance Through Binational Partnerships
Visionary thinkers, both policy makers and scientists, could see the need
for a Basin-wide management system as well as some uniform rules related
to fisheries within each lake, and they advocated that approach. As noted
previously, the numerous meetings held during the past 125 years by various
132

See Keith Schneider, The DNR/DEQ Split: "Cost-Saving" Measure Costs Millions

More, at http://www.mlui.org/pubs/glb/glbfa98/glb-su.fa9815.htm (last visited May 22,
2002).
03 See GARY S. OLSON, MICHIGAN SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, GOVERNOR ENGLER'S FY
2002-03 BUDGET: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2002), available
at http://www.senate.state.mi.us/sfa/Pubiications/AnnualReports/GovRec/GovsRec203.pdf.
The proposal would allow an early retirement option for certain senior state employees; the
program will save the budget $50.0 million by ensuring that only one of four retirees is
replaced.
'4 See Michigan Challenges EPA on Fish Consumption Advisories, at http://www.greatlakes.org/7-1-97.html (last visited May 30, 2002).
135 See Schneider, supra note 132.
136 See specifically Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, Part 303
(Wetlands Protection), §324.30307, 1994 Mich. Pub. Act 451.
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U.S. states, the states and Ontario, and by the U.S. and Canadian federal
governments to attempt to create uniform regulations for each lake agreed to
by all jurisdictions consistently ended in failure. As described by historian
Margaret Beattie Bogue in some detail, parochial interests, as well as fear
that some other jurisdiction's interests would prevail under uniform rules,
invariably prevented the adoption of such rules. 37 When Lake Erie "hit the
wall," the parties were finally prepared to give limited authority to an
international organization. In 1954, a positive step in this direction was
taken with the creation of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC).
A cooperative fisheries management structure has evolved under the aegis
of the GLFC. In 1966, the existing informal Lake Committees were re138
instituted under the Commission for each of the five main lakes.
Committee members include a formal representative from each of the state
and provincial fisheries agencies with responsibilities on that lake. Starting
in the 1980s, treaty-based groups of Aboriginal fishing communities that are
served by their own "commission" have also had formal representation on
the relevant Lake Committee.' 39 Up to this point in time, only the
Aboriginals south of the Canada-U.S. border (the American Indian tribes)
have had such representation, but this may occur north of the border in the
future.
This affiliation worked so well that the Great Lakes states declined the
opportunity in 1976 to form a Regional Fishery Management Council under
the U.S. Fishery Conservation and Management Act. 40 Instead, the states
came together with Ontario to develop a Strategic Great Lakes Fishery
Management Plan (SGLFMP, commonly referred to as the "Joint Strategic
Plan")' 4' signed formally in 1981; the federal fishery agencies participated
helpfully in this process. 142 The Joint Strategic Plan strengthened the fishery
governance community commitment to the lake committee process.
Indeed, the system may have "turned the corner" and adopted a
framework that could actually result in something approaching ecosystem137 See BOGUE, supra note 5, at 187-188.
131 The Lake Erie/Lake St. Clair Committee was originally structured as the Lake Erie

Committee and its Lake St. Clair subcommittee; the Lake Ontario Committee and its Upper St.
Lawrence River subcommittee was eventually restructured in the same manner. GLFC
Council of Lake Committees, at http://www.glfc.org/lakecom/clc/ clcprod.htm.
139 The Chippewa-Ottawa Treaty Fishery Management Authority has seats on the Superior,
Michigan and Huron Lake Committees, and the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife
Commission has a seat on the Lake Superior Committee. Members of the Council of Lake

Committees, at http://www.glfc.org/lakecom/clcmem.htm (last visited June 1, 2002).
140 See Dochoda & Jones, supra note 96, at 231.
141 Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Strategic Great Lakes Fishery Management Plan
(1981).
142 Ontario and the Canadian government had formulated a Strategic Plan for Ontario
Fisheries (SPOF), in the mid-1970s, which served as a kind of model for the SGLFMP.
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based management when the states and Ontario created the Plan. 143 Since the
Plan's adoption in 1981, the Lake Committees of the GLFC and their
associated Technical Committees, together with other interested
stakeholders, have worked to develop goals and objectives to conserve each
lake's fishery. The members of the Lake Committees are fishery agency
managers.'"n The Technical Committees are composed of agency biologists,
and they provide advice to the Lake Committees regarding the appropriate
quotas for perch and walleye and other fish community issues, as related to
the Fish Community Objectives (FCOs). 145 Government and tribal
representatives work together on the Lake to develop the FCOs 146 Progress
in achieving the objectives should provide a basis to subsequently monitor
and measure improvement of a lake's ecological state. As an additional step
under the FCOs, the Technical Committee of each Lake Committee develops
recommendations for the consideration of the full committee for total
allowable catch (TAC) for particular lake species in particular sections of a
lake. A revision of Fish Community Objectives has recently been completed
for Lake Erie. The Lake Committees meet annually. Other stakeholders,
such as commercial and recreational interests, provide input at these annual
gatherings that are open to the public. In theory, a "state of the lake"
conference is held every five years for each lake. Without the force of law,
these arrangements are implemented through consensus decision-making.
Reports are that this governance process has been particularly successful for
Lake Erie.
In addition the Joint Strategic Plan calls on the GLFC to act as arbitrator
47
when the parties are unable to achieve consensus on a point of difference.'
This provision, added in 1986, suggests that the Commission has gained the
requisite credibility in the fishery management communities. It has been
invoked on two occasions thus far,148 but the Commission has declined to act
in that manner, instead choosing to informally facilitate alternative dispute
resolution processes. Most recently, in 1992, the GLFC was asked to
arbitrate yellow perch allocation arrangements. 149 The arbitration process
143 GREAT LAKES FISHERY COMMISSION, STRATEGIC GREAT LAKES FISHERY MANAGEMENT
(1981) [hereinafter SGLFMP], superceded by GREAT LAKES FISHERY COMMISSION, A

PLAN

and (1997),
availableat http://www.glfc.org/fishmgmt/sglfmp97.htm [hereinafter Joint Strategic Plan].
'44 See id.
141 See id.
146 See GREAT LAKES FISHERY COMMISSION, A JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT
JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT OF GREAT LAKES FISHERIES (1994)

OF GREAT LAKES FISHERIES (1997), available at http://www.glfc.org/fishmgmt/sglfmp97.htm

[hereinafter Joint Strategic Plan].
147 See id.
148 See Dochoda & Jones, supra note 96, at 231.
149 See id.
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was delayed by Canadian concerns that its Department of Fisheries and
Oceans (DFO) staffer serving on the arbitration panel might be called upon
to cast a potentially tie-breaking vote. 150 Despite the delay, the parties
eventually reached agreement, so the arbitration request was dropped.' 1
The governance of fisheries may be converging on the governance of fish
habitat and ecosystem quality in general. An example of environmental
problem solving that involves local stakeholders is that of the International
Joint Commission's Remedial Action Plan (RAP) process. 152 Starting in the
mid-1980s, the IJC's Great Lakes Water Quality Board identified, from
among many degraded locales, some 43 Areas of Concern (AOCs) around
the basin and on some tributaries where environmental quality was seriously
impaired and the objectives of the GLWQA were not met. 153 In 33 of the 43
areas, broadly representative stakeholder groups were formed to develop
RAPs for their AOC. 154 Conceptually, a shift in effective governance was
underway. Recognizing the interests and knowledge of the stakeholders, on
the one hand, and the importance of their buy-in to actions that might be
taken to protect the lakes, individuals and representatives from
environmental groups, industry, and state and local government worked
together to forge plans to renew the health of aquatic locales within the lake
and the lake as a whole.
How is Lake Erie governance faring on the ground? The GLFC
conducted a survey of perceptions of plan implementation in 1995.155 In
general, survey respondents maintained support for the plan and its
strategies, although it was believed by many that new issues had emerged
that should be addressed. 156 Frustration with the process was evident,
however. A respondent involved in the Lake Erie governance group
observed:
The Lake Erie Committee and agency performance to meet the
Fish
objectives of the committee are very satisfying to me.
community objectives - (fish management planning) - has been a
most frustrating and unsatisfactory experience, not because of agency
150

See id.

151 See id.
152

See John H. Hartig & Michael A. Zarull, A Great Lakes Mission, in UNDER RAPS:

TOWARD GRASSROOTS ECOLOGICAL DEMOCRACY IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN

5, 9 (John Hartig

& Michael A. Zarull eds., 1992).
151 See id. at 7.
154 See id. at 17.

155 Memorandum from Margaret Dochoda on the Results of SGLFMP Implementation
Review Survey 1 (Jan. 29, 1996) (on file with the Canada-United States Law Journal).
156 Margaret Dochoda, Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Successes and Problem Areas in
Implementation of the Joint Strategic Plan for Management of the Great Lakes Fisheries 4
(Feb. 23, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Canada-UnitedStates Law Journal).
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or committee performance but because the entire Lake Erie ecosystem
- the trophic system - is changing as we work. We have no basis in
experience to make predictions, we can speculate where community
[sic] is going but we have no predictions that allow us any level of
confidence on time line
or actual species composition of next stable
57
association of fishes. 1
This is a problem that needs to be addressed, perhaps indirectly through
adaptive management. In any case, this comment sets out the challenges of
managing a dynamic system.
Why has the combination of science and politics failed to guide the lake
ecosystem to sustainability, where the latter term does not imply "steady
state" but rather the absence of human-induced, disastrous surprises?
X.

COMMON PROPERTY/POOL RESOURCES REGIMES:
BOTTOM-UP CO-MANAGEMENT?

Theory
In many areas of the planet, natural resource governance now proceeds as
a combination of governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
interested individuals cooperating in some kind of partnership. Many
mechanisms are employed to facilitate this new, more inclusive, and, it is
Such
hoped, more successful, approach to resource conservation.
mechanisms are normally devised and employed in response to a crisis
situation involving a common property or pooled resource. The phrase
"common property resource" (CPR) is coming to be widely used as code for
a generic kind of socio-ecological governance institution. With respect to
ecological aspects, CP may refer to "common pool;" with respect to social
aspects, CP may refer to "common property." An epistemic community/peer
group/invisible college has emerged in recent decades with respect to this
generic phenomenon. 58 All of the CPR experts appear to use that term as
code for a complex evolving phenomenon and distance themselves from any
categorical, linear definition of any one of the three terms or any combination
of them. According to Berkes and Folke:
"'7 Id. at 47.
158 Researchers with some expertise in fisheries issues and active in this network in North
America include Fikret Berkes, Susan Hanna, Bonnie McCay, Elinor Ostrom and Evelyn
Pinkerton. Many are members of International Association for the Study of Common
Property, P.O. Box 2355, Gary, IN 46409, USA, email: iascp@indiana, Internet:
http://www.iascp.org.
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Common-property (common-pool resources) are defined as a class of
resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves
subtractability . . . Institutions have to deal with the two fundamental
management problems that arise from the two basic characteristics of
all such resources: how to control access to the resource (the
exclusion problem), and how to institute rules among users to solve
the potential divergence between
individual and collective rationality
159
(the subtractability problem).
Countless versions of an implicit CPR approach to governance have
emerged among humans during the past million years. From an ecological
perspective this CPR construct overlaps with such notions as niche
differentiation among organisms of different species, the complementarity of
selfishness and selflessness within successful selective processes in
evolution.
In the past, formal studies that test this approach to governance within the
CPR epistemic community seem to have been limited mostly to small socioecological systems or small Cultural-Natural Ecosystems (CNE) in which the
immediate users of a CPR are empowered to participate actively in the
relevant governance process.1 60 In cases where the local CNE is nested and
inter-meshed within a larger regional CNE, a co-management form of CPR
governance may emerge. Where such co-management forges an explicit link
between local governance and regional or national governance,
the adjective
"cross-scale" may be added to the co-management term.' 61
However, the CPR approach has seldom been extended to governance of
fisheries in which different sectors of a "fishery" (ceremonial, artisan,
recreational, extensive capture commercial and intensive aquaculture
commercial fishers) place different demands on the available resources.
Furthermore, the CPR approach has seldom been applied to cases of
migratory and/or straddling stocks of fish that are subject to harvest by a
complex of fishers on all sides of the boundary of a jurisdiction that plays a
prominent role in the inter-jurisdictional governance of the relevant CNE.
159 Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke, Linking Social and Ecological Systems for Resilience and
Sustainability, in LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: MANAGEMENT FOR BUILDING

RESILIENCE 1, 6 (Fiket Berkes & Carl Folke eds., 1998) [emphasis theirs].
160 For example, in Tracy Dobson, Community Participation in Natural Resources
Management in Malawi: Charting a New Course for Sustainability, 1998 COLO. J. INT'L

ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 153, the author evaluates attempts to introduce such management
approaches in a struggling developing nation.
1 With Oran Young's approach to governance regime formation, inter-jurisdictional "comanagement" arrangements can be crafted to include "cross-scale interactions." See generally
Young, InstitutionalInterplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale Interactions,
in The Drama of the Commons, supra note 122, at 263.
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By using a form of "stakeholder analysis," the International Development
Research Centre in Canada and the International Union for the Conservation
of Nature and Natural Resources has been able to successfully extend the
CPR approach to the governance of these multisector/multidemand fisheries.162
There is a growing literature on international and global CPR regimes.
Many versions of CPR governance and of co-management hybrids are
currently operative with respect to governance of subsystems, including the
fisheries, of the Cultural/Natural Ecosystem of the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence
River Ecosystem. But it has been difficult to apply it to cases of migratory
and/or straddling stocks of fish because the exclusion and subtractability
aspects cannot be addressed directly. As of yet, there has been no attempt to
identify and describe a representative subset of such governance capabilities
related to fisheries in our Basin.
Application to Lake Erie
In light of what we understand to be the free-flowing dialogue in the Lake
Erie committees and the lack of rigid formality, it may be useful to consider
developing cross-scale co-management groups for each major stock of each
major species. In keeping with CPR principles followed elsewhere, their
memberships should include representatives from all stakeholder groups
from both sides of the inter-jurisdictional border that the stock crosses in its
migrations. Selection of members should assure that some of the specialized
expertise needed for particular problems, i.e., lamprey control. The chair
could be given some supervisory authority for capturing, processing and
transmitting data to relevant agencies.
Moreover, a well-designed
monitoring system needs to be implemented.
It may be tacitly accepted that the unsettled state of the governance of
Lake Erie fisheries is due partly to the unsettled state of the Lake Erie
ecosystem generally and partly to the shifting balance in political power
between the different types of fishers within each jurisdiction. So, flexibility
as is characteristic with CP-related co-management may be a virtue.
XI.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES AND
THE TECHNICAL GUIDELINES

While local communities have become more deeply involved with and
connected to fisheries management processes, we should also consider the
usefulness and application of management strategies developed at the global
level. In particular, we find that the Code of Conduct for Responsible
162

See generally Fikret Berkes, Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages: Perspectives from the

Bottom Up, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 73, at 263-321.
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Fisheries (CCRF), 16 3 developed through the Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations (U.N. FAO), could be a useful addition to
the panoply of management strategies employed to move to
responsible/sustainable fisheries at Lake Erie and elsewhere.
At its 94 th Session in 1988, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations Council decided that
Sustainable development is the management and conservation of the
natural resource base, and the orientation of technological and
institutional change in such a manner as to ensure the attainment and
continued satisfaction of human needs for present and future
generations. Such sustainable development.., conserves land, water,
plant genetic resources, is environmentally non-degrading,
technologically appropriate, economically viable and socially
acceptable. 164
The international process for formulating the CCRF, was formally
initiated in 1991 for the following reasons:
By the late 1980s it became clear ... that fisheries resources could no
longer sustain [recent levels of] rapid and often uncontrolled
exploitation and development, and that new approaches to fisheries
conservation
and
environmental
management
embracing
considerations were urgently needed. The situation was aggravated by
the realization that unregulated fisheries on the high seas, in some
cases involving straddling and highly migratory fish species, which
occur within and outside [Exclusive Economic Zones], were becoming
a matter of increasing concern.
[FAO's] Committee on Fisheries (COFI) at its Nineteenth Session
new concepts which
in March 1991 called for the development of
65
fisheries.'
sustained
responsible,
to
lead
would
A complex, interactive process of transnational negotiation commenced in
1991, as special panels were convened by FAO to draft the CCRF and its
Appendices. 166 The UN Conference on Environment and Development
163

U.N. FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Oct. 31, 1995), available at

http://www.fao.org/fi/ agreem/codecond/ficonde.asp [hereinafter CCRF].
I4 U.N. FAO, 94th Sess. U.N. Doc. CL 94/6 (1988).
165 Id., at Preface.
166 See Technical Consultation on the Feasibility of Developing Non-Discriminatory
Technical Guidelines for Eco-Labelling of Products from Marine Capture Fisheries, U.N.
FAO, U.N. Doc. FI:EMF/98/4 (1998), available at http://www.fao.org/fi/faocons/ecolab/fiemf4f.asp.
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(UNCED) convened in Rio in 1992;167 the UN Conference on Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks with respect to the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was held starting in April
1993,168 reaching final agreement in 1995;169 and a Committee on Fisheries
(COFI) meeting was held in October 1995.170
The 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and its Technical
Guidelines Appendices is intended to be consistent with:
*

*
*

"Our Common Future," the 1987 Report of the World Commission
on Environment and Sustainable Development, 171 chaired by Gro
Harlem Brundtland;
The Rio Declaration 172 and Agenda 21173 from the 1992 UNCED; as
well as
New elements in the
1995 U.N. Convention relating to straddling and
74
migratory stocks. 1

The Rio Declaration's Principle 15 is its "precautionary principle:"
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
167

See Center for International Earth Science Information Network, UNCED Collection, at

http://www.ciesin.org/datasets/unced/unced.html (last visited May 18, 2002).
168 United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/fish-stocksconference/fishstocksconference.htm
(last visited May 17, 2002).
169 Id.
170 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Things to Look for in the
Intersessional Period, 7 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. 39, § 26 (1994), at http://www.iisd.ca/
linkages/vo107/0739026e.html (last visited May 18, 2002).
171 See generally U.N. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
172 See, e.g., Report of the United Nations

Conference on Environment and Development,

Annex I, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26
(Vol. 1), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl51/
aconfl 5126-1 annex 1.htm (last visited May 18, 2002) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
173 See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda
21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vols. I-Ill) (1992), available at http://www.un.org/esa/
sustdev/agenda2ltext.htm (last visited May 17, 2002), CCRF, supra note 163, art. 3.2(c).
114 Id., art. 3.2(a), see generally Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF./164/37 (1995), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements/texts/fish-stocks-agreement/CONF164_37.htm (last visited May 17, 2002)
[hereinafter UNCLOS Fish Stocks Agreement].

2002]

Dobson, Regier & Taylor-Lake Erie Ecosystem Governance

scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost75
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
The [UN] Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Stocks
(New York, 1992-1995) also developed a consensus on the need to introduce
or strengthen the precautionary approach to fishery management, imbedding
the concept of its
outcome in the draft 17 6 and outlining elements for its
77
1
implementation.
The 1995 CCRF contains a few explicit references to the term
"sustainable development."'' 78 The terms "maximum sustainable yield" or
"optimum sustainable yield," if used at all, are not prominent. The terms
"conservation" and "responsible" are used frequently, but not defined
explicitly leaving the reader to 1infer
their meanings from the particular
79
contexts in which they were used.
Article 6 of the CCRF is a list of General Principles of responsible
fisheries, with key notions of each principle summarized as follows:
1. Ecosystem approach, a right to fish implies an obligation for
ecosystem stewardship;
2. Sustainable development;
3. Over-capacity and excess fishing effort prevention, degraded
resources rehabilitation;
4. Scientific information and traditional knowledge to inform
management decisions;
5. Precautionary approach to fishing and activities that affect fish
habitat;
6. Selective and safe fishing gear;
7. Quality of fish and fish products maintenance;
8. Critical fisheries habitats protection;
9. Integration of fisheries interests into complex coastal area
governance;
10. Effective legal measures to ensure monitoring, planning and
management;
11. Responsibilities of a nation with flags on fishing vessels;
12. Cooperation in international law and related fisheries institutions;
13. Transparency and timeliness of decision processes;
175 Rio Declaration, supra note 172, at Principle 15.
176 See UNCLOS Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 174, art. 5(c).
177

See id., art. 6.

178 CCRF, supra note 163, at Preamble, see also id., arts. 6.2, 10.1.3, 11.1.5, 11.2.2.
179 See id. The word "conservation" (not used in reference to other agreements with the
word "conservation" in their titles) is used 60 times in the document; the word "responsible" is
used 34 times.
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14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Trade consistent with principles of the World Trade Organization;
Inter-jurisdictional dispute resolution;
Collaboration in governance by capture and culture fisheries;
Safe working and living conditions for fisheries personnel;
Preferential rights of artisan
and small-scale fishers; and
180
Responsible aquaculture.

The Technical Guidelines as Appendices to the CCRF include procedures
pertaining to (1) fishing operations; 181 (2) the precautionary approach as
applied to capture fisheries and species introductions; 182 (3) integrating
fisheries into coastal area management; 83 (4) fisheries management;1 84 (5)
aquaculture development; 185 and (6) inland fisheries.' 86 Hence, the CCRF,
along with the relevant applicable guidelines, is intended to relate to any kind
of fishery anywhere in the world
One way to perform a quick "check" of the possible relevance of CCRF
to a particular fishery in the GL/SLRB would be to convene a panel of
relevant experts for a day to examine current fishing, management and
governance practices in that fishery with respect to each of the 19 Principles.
An example of such a fishery might be the walleye fishery of the western
half of Lake Erie. This approach could be termed "top down" in that it
would involve efforts to perceive fisheries activities in our Basin within a
global context.

180

See generally CCRF, art. 6.

181

FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FISHING OPERATIONS

(Technical Guide for Responsible Fisheries, No. 1, 1996), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/
document/techguid/fishopel .pdf.
182

FOOD &

AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

PRECAUTIONARY

TO CAPTURE FISHERIES AND SPECIES INTRODUCTION (Technical Guide for
Responsible Fisheries, No. 2, 1996), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/document/techguid/
fishpre2.pdf.
APPROACH

183

FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

INTEGRATION OF

(Technical Guide for Responsible Fisheries,
No. 3, 1996), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/document/techguid/fishcoa3.pdf.
FISHERIES INTO COASTAL AREA MANAGEMENT

184

FOOD

&

AGRICULTURE

ORGANIZATION

OF

THE

UNITED

NATIONS,

FISHERIES

MANAGEMENT (Technical Guide for Responsible Fisheries, No. 4, 1996), availableat ftp://ftp.
fao.org/fi/document/techguid/ fishman4.pdf.
185

FOOD

&

AGRICULTURE

ORGANIZATION

OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

AQUACULTURE

DEVELOPMENT (Technical Guide for Responsible Fisheries, No. 5, 1996), available at ftp://ftp.

fao.org/fi/document/techguid/ fishaqu5.pdf.
186

FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

INLAND FISHERIES

(Technical Guide for Responsible Fisheries, No. 6, 1996), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/
document/techguid/fishinl6.pdf.
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XII.

CONCLUSION

We have sought to depict scientific, historical and political
understandings of the degradation of the Lake Erie Basin since about 1850.
Our discussion lays out the multiple ways in which human intervention,
fueled sometimes by greed and lacking adequate knowledge, was the primary
driver in the "near-death" of the system; the Basin seemed to be degrading
into an ecological state with unnatural, offensive and dangerous features that
would likely be irreversible. We have identified examples of apparently
successful policy and management interventions that have partially restored
its health, in the face of new harmful stresses that are again posing novel
threats. We suggest that building on these local successes, along with
adapting successful approaches from outside the Basin, and working on
multiple levels of governance, including the "grass roots," appears to be a
way forward in governing such a complex and dynamic living system.
XIII.
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APPENDIX II: SELECTED LAWS AND AGENCIES RELEVANT TO
GL/SLB GOVERNANCE
Agencies
Binational
International Joint Commission - http://www.ijc.org
Great Lakes Fishery Commission - http://www.glfc.org
Federal
Environmental Protection Agency - http://www.epa.gov
Environment Canada - http://www.ec.gc.ca
National
Oceanographic
and Atmospheric
Administration
http://www.noaa.gov
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service - http://www.fws.gov
U.S. Geological Survey - http://www.usgs.gov
Tribal
Great
Lakes
Indian
Fish
and
Wildlife
Commission
http://www.glifwc.org
Chippewa-Ottawa Resource Authority (successor to COTFMA)
http://www. 1836cora.org

-

Provincial/State
Great Lakes Commission - http://www.glc.org
Council of Great Lakes Governors - http://www.cglg.org
Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada - http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca
Ontario
Ministry
of
the
Environment
and
Energy
http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/
Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Fisheries Division http://www.michigan.-gov/dnr/ 0,1607,7-153-10364--,00.html
Michigan
Department
of
Environmental
Quality
http://www.michigan.gov/deg
Ohio
Department
of
Environmental
Protection
http://www.epa.ohio.gov/
Ohio Department of Natural Resources - http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/
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Pennsylvania
Department
of
Environmental
Protection
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/
Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission - http://www.fish.state.pa.us/
New York Department of Environmental Conservation, Bureau of
Fisheries - http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/dfwmr/fish/index.html
Non-Governmental Organizations
Great Lakes United - http://www.glu.org/mainpage.htm
Conventions
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916,
U.S.-G.B (for Canada), 39 Stat. 1702.
Inland Fisheries Treaty, 1908 (withdrawn in 1914).
Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36
Stat. 2448.
Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, Sept. 10, 1954, U.S.-Can., 6
U.S.T. 2836, T.I.A.S. 3326.
Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, U.S.-Can., April 15, 1972,
23 U.S.T. 301, amended Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383, amended by
Protocol, Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11,551.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
Federal statutes
Canada
Fisheries Act, R.S. ch. F-14 (1985).
United States
Anadromous Fish Conservation Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 757a-g
(West 2000).
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1464
(West 2000).
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West
2000).
Estuary Protection Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1226 (1994).
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Federal Aid in Fish (Dingell-Johnson Sport Fish) Restoration Act of
1950, 16 U.S.C. §§ 777, 777a-i, 777k-m (1994).
Federal Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 791-825 (West 2000)
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 1987, P.L. 100-4,
February 4, 1987; 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 33 U.S.C.).
Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16 USCA §§ 742a to 742j, 742j-1, 742j-2
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 661-666
(West 2000).
Fishermen's Protective Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971-1980 (West
2000).
Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 712, 7421
(1994).
Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. §§
941-941g (1994).
Great Lakes Fishery Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. §§ 931-933, 935-939, 939a939c (1994).
Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act of 1986, 16 USCA §§ 4101-4107
(1994).
Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-78 (1994).
National Aquaculture Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1994).
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335,
4341-4346, 4346a, 4346b, 4347 (1994)).
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16
U.S.C. §§ 668dd-ee (1994).
Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 104-646, 104 Stat. 4761 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 4701, 4702, 4711, 4712-4714, 4721-4728, 4741, 4751
(1994)).
Sikes Act of 1960 (fed/state coordination), Pub. L. No. 86-797, 74 Stat.
1052 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 670, 670a-c, 670c-1,
670d-m, 670o (West 2000))
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271 to 1285, 1285a, 1285b,
1286, 1287 (1994)).
State/Provincial
Great Lakes Basin Compact, 1954.
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 324 (1994) contains 246 entries that pertain to
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Fisheries Division powers as well as restrictions on recreational and
commercial fishing.

